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"While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be."1
Justice Harlan F. Stone
U.S. Supreme Court
1. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).
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I. Introduction
The scope of intellectual property protection to be accorded
computer programs or algorithms2 has remained an unsettled
question since the advent of the computer.3 Those favoring and
those disfavoring broad protection each warn of potential chil-
2. The terms, "computer programs" and "software," are interchangeable and
are distinguished from algorithms and computer hardware. Note, Computer Intel-
lectual Property and Conceptual Severance, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1046 (1990) [herein-
after Conceptual Severance].
Hardware consists of the physical devices themselves, the collection of tran-
sistors in groups of integrated circuits ("chips") and their wired interconnec-
tions. Software, the code that ultimately resides in the memory chips, tells
the microprocessor and other hardware what to do. Algorithms are the
purely abstract routines for accomplishing certain processing goals ....
Id. at 1047 (citations omitted). See also Fred E. McKelvey, Patentable Subject Mat-
ter: Mathematical Algorithms and Computer Programs, 1106 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OF-
FICE 5 (1989).
A "process" or "algorithm" is a step-by-step procedure to arrive at a
given result. In the patent arena, a "computer process" or "computer al-
gorithm" is a process, i.e., a series of steps, which is performed by a com-
puter. A "[computer] program is a sequence of coded instructions for a
digital computer." Computer programs are equivalently known as
"software."
Unfortunately for discussion in this area, "[b]oth the series of steps per-
formed by a computer, and the software directing those steps, have acquired
the name 'computer programs.'" What is sought to be protected by patent is
the underlying process....
"Confusion may be avoided if it be realized that what is at issue is not
the 'program,' i.e., the software, but the process steps which the software
directs the computer to perform."
Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted). At the risk of perpetuating this confusion, this
Comment uses "computer program" to describe "computer processes" because "pro-
cess" implies that the subject matter is statutory. See infra notes 14-20 and ac-
companying text. See also John C. Reich, Comment, Guidelines for Evaluating
Whether a Claim That Embodies an Algorithm Constitutes Patentable Subject Mat-
ter, 5 SoFTARE L.J. 461 (1992) (analyzing the legal definition of "algorithm" and
proposing an analytical method for determining whether a claim that recites an
algorithm constitutes patentable subject matter).
3. Forms of intellectual property protection for software include patent, trade
secret, and copyright. See generally, Scott M. Alter, Selecting Protection for Com-
puter Programs, 39 FED. B. NEWS & J. 264 (1992) (describing major characteristics
of trade secret, copyright, and patent protection in relation to protecting computer
programs and identifying advantages and disadvantages of each). See also James
J. Maune, Computer Software as Property, 5 J. SUFFOLK AcAD. L. 21 (1988) (dis-
cussing patent, copyright, trade secret, trademark, and service mark protection of
software and providing guidance for transactions involving the transfer of software
intellectual property rights); Frederick K. Longhofer, Patentability of Computer
Programs, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 125 (1982).
3
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ling effects on computer software innovation. 4 Overly broad
protection may afford protection to ideas and, consequently,
foreclose avenues for innovation due to fear of infringement con-
sequences. Overly narrow protection may prove insufficient in-
centive to motivate innovation. Regardless of which argument
one favors, the resulting uncertainty about the scope of protec-
tion has spawned ad hoc adjudicatory decisions that are difficult
to reconcile, particularly in the area of patent law. Although
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) and its
successor court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("Federal Circuit"), 5 have provided some analytical guidance,
4. See John M. Griem, Jr., Note, Against a Sui Generis System of Intellectual
Property for Computer Software, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145, 147 n.8 (1993). For ar-
guments that the absence of patent protection would chill innovation, see Donald
S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 959, 1020 (1986);
David Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 241, 248 (1968) ("Although there are methods of protection other than patent
laws, none of these methods meets as well as patent protection the needs of the
computer industry."). For contrary arguments that the presence of patent protec-
tion would chill software innovation, see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited:
The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-
Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1031 n.16 (1990); Arthur R. Miller, Copy-
right Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARv. L. REV. 977, 1073 (1993) (citing
Against Software Patents: The League for Programming Freedom, 14 HASTINGS
Comm. & ENT. L.J. 297, 297 n.a (1992) ("New monopolies, known as software pat-
ents and interface copyrights, have taken away our freedom of expression and our
ability to do a good job.")). See also Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Com-
paring the Views of Lawyers and User Interface Designers on the Software Copy-
right "Look and Feel" Lawsuits, 30 JuIME'rmcs J. 121, 140 (1989) (survey
demonstrating opposition to computer program patent protection).
5. The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295 (1988)). The Federal Circuit was granted exclusive jurisdiction over patent
appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295. Title 28, § 1295, states, in pertinent part:
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have
exclusive jurisdiction-
(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court ... if the jurisdic-
tion of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this
title [with exceptions]...
(4) of an appeal from a decision of-
(A) the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the Patent and
Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and
interferences;
(B) the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks... ; or
(C) a district court to which a case was directed pursuant to section
145 or 146 of title 35.
790
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their piecemeal case-by-case approach has led to a'set of legal
standards that are sometimes inconsistent and are often
confusing.
This Comment examines the various attempts to delimit
the scope of mathematical algorithm and computer software
patentability. As background, Part II.A provides an overview of
patent law. Parts II.B and C then review the Supreme Court's
substantive and the C.C.P.A.'s analytical approaches to mathe-
matical algorithm patentability. Part II.D introduces means-
plus-function claim format. Part II.E contrasts the C.C.P.A.'s
and the Federal Circuit's treatment of means-plus-function
claims and discusses how this contrasting treatment has af-
fected software cases. Parts II.F and G discuss the two most
recent and important cases, in which the Federal Circuit estab-
lished how means-plus-function claims must be interpreted-
generally, and in computer software patent applications.
Part III analyzes the case law discussed in Part II. Part
III.A examines Congress' silence regarding computer software
patentability and how that silence has affected software patent-
ability jurisprudence. Part III.B addresses some problems with
judicially created frameworks for analyzing software claims.
Part III.C examines the premise that, under the current
frameworks, software claims drafted as machines may be more
patentable than those drafted as processes. Part III.D exam-
ines whether the Federal Circuit correctly ascertained the role
of means-plus-function claims-generally, and in software
claims. Parts III.D and III.E collectively postulate that the two
most recent cases demonstrate that the Federal Circuit is cau-
tiously eroding early software patentability doctrine to allow for
broader software patent protection. Finally, this comment cau-
tions that the current status of the law requires patent practi-
tioners to be particularly artful in drafting software patent
applications, to engage in limited legal fiction in certain in-
28 U.S.C. § 1295. Section 1338 confers original jurisdiction on the district courts
in civil actions related to patents. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988). Patent appeals,
which, prior to 1982, were made to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
federal courts of appeals in the individual states, were consolidated in the Federal
Circuit to "provide nation-wide uniformity in patent law,.., make the rules ap-
plied in patent litigation more predictable and... eliminate the expensive, time-
consuming, and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in the
field." H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981).
5
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stances, and to inform their clients of the uncertainty that still
exists in this area of patent law.
II. Background
A. Overview of Patent Law
1. Constitutional Basis and Historical Perspective
The basis of United States patent law is Article 1, Section
8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, which states that
"The congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries."6 The Constitution thereby guaranteed
rights to the inventor and set the limits of protection in a single
provision. 7
The Constitution ostensibly allows the states to exercise
patent-granting power. As stated by Chief Justice John Mar-
shall in Gibbons v. Ogden,8 the power:
[Hias frequently been exercised by the State of New-York, and by
other States, before the adoption of the constitution. It is not
granted exclusively to Congress. No exclusive terms are used.
The grant is affirmative and general, like all the other powers.
There is no express prohibition upon the States against the exer-
cise of it. 9
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8. The provision was both a patent and a copy-
right provision. The framers, in speaking of "Science," were referring to the work
of authors, and in referring to "useful Arts," meant the work of inventors. John V.
Orth, Thinking About Law Historically: Why Bother? 70 N.C. L. REv. 287, 291
(1991); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 20-21 (3d ed. 1993). Removing the copyright provision, the text would
read: "The congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of... useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their...
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. According to Kenneth Burchfiel, while Thomas Jefferson was in France
during the summer of 1787, the provision was drafted and unanimously approved
with no recorded debate. Kenneth Burchflel, Revising the "Original" Patent
Clause: Pseudohistory in Constitutional Construction, 2 HARv. J. LAw & TECH.
163, 165-66 (1989). However, Jefferson was skeptical that the scientific progress
benefits of granting exclusive rights would overcome the hazards of granting mo-
nopolies even for limited times. Id.
8. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
9. Id. at 45.
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For a short time after the adoption of the Constitution, the
states exercised this power to protect inventors by issuing sev-
eral patents. 10 However, most inventors wanted broader protec-
tion than the territorial limits of a single state, and the
constitutional provision provided nation-wide coverage." The
geographically broader federal protection, combined with the
supremacy of federal law when state laws conflicted with fed-
eral law, effectively led to the extinction of state patent law soon
after the adoption of the Constitution. 12
2. Modern Patent Law
Federal patent law is embodied in Title 35 of the United
States Code. 13 In § 101,14 Congress identified patentable sub-
ject matter:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.15
Patentable subject matter thereby included processes, methods,
machines, and compositions of matter.'6 The term, "process," is
used interchangeably with the term, "method," and the term,
"machine," is likewise used interchangeably with the term, "ap-
10. See generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS op AMElUCAN PATENT AND
COPYIGHT LAW 84-103 (1967). The states granted patents at least as late as 1815,
when Massachusetts granted John L. Sullivan a patent on a tug boat invention,
geographically limited to the Connecticut river. Pasquale J. Federico, State Pat-
ents, J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y, July 1936, at 43, 53.
11. Federico, supra note 10, at 53-54.
12. Id.
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1988).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
15. Id.
16. Id. Machine has been distinguished from process:
The term machine includes every mechanical device or combination of
mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a cer-
tain effect or result. But where the result or effect is produced by chemical
action, by the operation or application of some element or power of nature,
or of one substance to another, such modes, methods, or operations, are
called processes.
Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1854).
793
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paratus." 17 The Supreme Court has declared that, in § 101,18
"Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include any-
thing under the sun that is made by man.'"19 Judicially identi-
fied exceptions include ideas, expression, natural phenomena,
and methods of doing business.20
To merit a patent, an invention must satisfy "positive" pat-
entability requirements-the invention must be new, useful,
and advance the state of technology.21 The "new" requirement
is otherwise termed "novelty"; an invention lacks novelty if all
of its elements may be found in a single prior art source. 22 An
17. McKelvey, supra note 2, at 6. See also Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780
(1877) (defining "process" in a patent infringement action regarding a high-quality
flour manufacturing process).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
19. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (ultimately declaring that,
although mathematical algorithms are themselves unpatentable, the use of such
algorithms does not render otherwise patentable subject matter unpatentable)
(quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)). The term, "statutory subject matter," refers herein to
that subject matter that fulfills the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101, without fall-
ing within a judicially identified exception.
20. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185. "Excluded from such patent protection are laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." Id. See also In re Chatfield, 545
F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
Some inventions, however meritorious, do not constitute patentable subject
matter, e. g., printed matter, In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392 (1969); methods of
doing business, In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982 (1934); purely mental steps, In re
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (1969), In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (1970); naturally
occurring phenomena or laws of nature, O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
62 (1853); a mathematical formula and the algorithm therefor, Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Id. at 157.
21. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988). Section 101 allows patents for "any new and
useful" process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
See also infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Section 102, entitled "Conditions for patentability;
novelty and loss of right to patent," states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless- (a) the invention was known
or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publi-
cation in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the appli-
cant for patent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in
the United States.
Id. The novelty standard of § 102 precludes patent issuance only when a single
prior art source contains every element of the claimed invention. Structural Rub-
ber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1986). "This court
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/3
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invention must also advance the state of technology, and to do
so it must be nonobvious to one possessing ordinary skill in the
art.23 This requirement has also been referred to as a minimum
level of inventiveness. 24
A patent confers the right to exclude others.25 Just as in
has repeatedly stated that the defense of lack of novelty (i.e., 'anticipation') can
only be established by a single prior art reference which discloses each and every
element of the claimed invention." Id. (citations omitted).
23. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Section 103 states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in § 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made.
Id. The nonobviousness test requires comparing the claimed invention to the prior
art and considering secondary factors. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966).
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against
this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to
the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be
patented.
Id. at 17-18. See also NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTA-
BILITY 5:101-5:111 (J. Witherspoon ed., 1980); see also ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 32-33 (1992).
24. Unlike the novelty and utility (usefulness) requirements, which were im-
posed by the Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, the "nonobviousness"
requirement was not codified until as recently as 1952 in the Patent Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35
U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). Prior to 1952, it was the judicially imposed re-
quirement of "inventiveness." See generally Edmund W. Kitch, Graham v. John
Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 293.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). Section 154 states:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years, subject to the
payment of fees as provided for in this title, of the right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States,
and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using or
selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States,
products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particu-
lars thereof. A copy of the specification and drawings shall be annexed to
the patent and be a part thereof.
9
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property law,26 the right to exclude others may be enforced and/
or remedied by injunction and damages.27 Consistent with the
constitutional "limited times" provision, patents are granted for
the limited time of seventeen years. 28 Finally, the modern pat-
26. For an argument that intellectual property law should use the property
law bundle-of-rights and market-based concepts, see Conceptual Severance, supra
note 2.
27. Injunctions are available under 35 U.S.C. § 283, which states that "[t]he
several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right se-
cured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable." 35 U.S.C. § 283
(1988). Because the essence of the patent right is the right to exclude others, in-
junctions are liberally granted. See, e.g., Smith Intl v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d
1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (setting a low burden of proof for preliminary injunc-
tions, declaring that, "where validity and continuing infringement have been
clearly established... immediate irreparable harm is presumed. To hold other-
wise would be contrary to the public policy underlying the patent laws.") (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983). Damages are available under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284, which states that, "[ulpon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988).
Damages take the form of reasonable royalties, at a minimum, or lost profits upon
overcoming substantial evidentiary hurdles. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre
Works, 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted).
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent
the infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner must
prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable nonin-
fringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing capability to ex-
ploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made....
When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, cannot be proved, the patent
owner is entitled to a reasonable royalty. A reasonable royalty is an amount
"which a person, desiring to manufacture and sell a patented article, as a
business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to
make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit."
Id. at 1156, 1157-58 (citations omitted). In appropriate circumstances, a court may
award treble damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and attorney fees under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-285 (1988). See generally Robert Neuner, The Law of
Damages in Patent Cases, in PATENT LITIGATION 1991 (PLI Pat. Copyrights Trade-
marks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3873, 1991). For a his-
tory of patent damages, see Timothy J. Malloy et al., The Ongoing Evolution of the
Law of Patent Damages, in PATENT LITIGATION 1992, at 279, 284-86 (PLI Pat.
Copyrights Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G-350,
1992).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). After the expiration of a patent, the invention be-
comes part of the public domain. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489
U.S. 141, 152 (1989) ("We have long held that after the expiration of a federal
patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/3
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ent grant is not free-it requires full disclosure of the inven-
tion.29 Full disclosure assures that the public can exercise its
right to freely use the invention after the expiration of the pat-
ent monopoly and serves as the patentee's consideration for the
government's exclusive rights guarantee.30 Failure to fully dis-
close the invention renders the patent invalid.31
The term, "specification," refers to the body of the patent
application, which contains, inter alia, the title, a description of
prior art, a summary, and a detailed description of the inven-
tion, and is contrasted with the claims, which are concise state-
ments that point out the precise metes and bounds of the
invention.3 2 The clause that requires patent claims is 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, paragraph 2, which states that "[tihe specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant re-
gards as his invention."33 After the applicant submits the speci-
matter of federal law.") (citations omitted). Effective June 8, 1995, the patent term
will be 20 years from the patent filing date. Uruguay Rounds Agreements Act,
Pub. L. 103-465, §§ 532(a)(1), 534, 108 Stat. 4983, 4990 (1994) (to be codified at 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)). See also Lawrence Rosenthal, The TRIPs Provisions of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Now Approved by Congress, Will Bring About Sig-
nificant Changes as U.S. Patent Law Goes Global, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 26, 1994-Jan. 2,
1995, at B4, B8.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it per-
tains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). See generally Thomas L. Irving et al., The Significant Fed-
eral Circuit Cases Interpreting Section 112, 41 Am. U. L. REV. 621 (1992).
30. Irving et al., supra note 29, at 623.
[Tihe patent system's quid pro quo nature . . . is a social contract or
franchise. Disclosure by the inventor, then, is the consideration in the social
contract between the inventor and the government. [Section 112] sets forth
the requirements of disclosure. If the disclosure is insufficient to enable a
skilled person to make and use the claimed invention, then there is a failure
of consideration, and the patent is invalid.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
31. Id.
32. See generally RONALD B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAw: A PRACTITIONER'S GuIDE
(1988) (providing, inter alia, a structural outline of patent applications and a guide
to preparing specifications and claims).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
11
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fication and claims to the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
the PTO issues either a notice of allowance or an office action,
which would contain rejections or objections.34 The applicant
may respond to an office action by filing an amendment.3 5 Cor-
respondence to and from the PTO, called "patent prosecution,"36
continues until the claims are allowed or until the examiner is-
sues a "final office action."3 7 If the application is rejected in a
final office action, the applicant may appeal to the PTO Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (B.P.A.I. or "Board").38 Sub-
sequent appeal, if any, is to the Federal Circuit.39
B. Supreme Court Analysis of Mathematical Algorithm
Claims
1. Gottschalk v. Benson:40 The First Supreme Court
Decision on the Patentability of Mathematical
Algorithms
During the 1960s, the PTO and the courts were faced with
the question of whether the patent laws might protect computer
hardware or software. 41 Computers and computer hardware
34. See HILDRETH, supra note 32, at 189. Responses from the PTO are called
"office actions," and may include claim rejections, a list of defects in the specifica-
tion and figures, prior art that may render the invention obvious or not novel, and
other objections. DAVID PRESSMAN, PATENT IT YOURSELF: A COMPLETE LEGAL
GUIDE FOR INVENTORS 13/3-13/4 (2d ed. 1988).
35. PRESSMAN, supra note 34, at 13/4, 13/30-13/39. See also HILDRETH, supra
note 32, at 189-203 (teaching how to prepare an amendment); Richard G. Berkley,
Some Practical Aspects of Amendment Practice in the Electro-Mechanical Arts, in
ADVANCED CLAIM DRAFTING AND AMENDMENT WRITING WORKSHOP 1992 (Pat. Copy-
rights Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3889, 1994)
(substantive advice in overcoming examiners' objections without unduly narrowing
patent protection).
36. PRESSMAN, supra note 34, at 13/4.
37. Id. An amendment may be filed even after a final office action. Id. at 13/
42. If the examiner agrees with the amendment, the examiner will allow the
claims; otherwise the examiner will issue an "'advisory action' reiterating the ex-
aminer's former position." Id.
38. Id. See also HILDRETH, supra note 32, at 221-28 (explaining how to pre-
pare an appeal brief).
39. HILDRETH, supra note 32, at 189 (1992).
40. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
41. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE
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were deemed squarely within § 10142 machines and articles of
manufacture and, therefore, were considered patentable subject
matter.43 However, software was a more complex issue because
computer programs and mathematical algorithms closely re-
semble the mental process required to solve a problem. 44
Although the expression of mental processes or steps in
software has been held copyrightable, 45 the first statement by
the Supreme Court regarding patentability was in Gottschalk v.
Benson,4" where the Court held that such mental steps, at least
as embodied in mathematical algorithms, are unpatentable. 47
Benson had submitted patent claims that asserted a method for
converting binary coded decimal numerals into binary numer-
als.48 The claims were not limited to any particular apparatus
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of
the lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if
these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic
because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without
this search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere regis-
tration and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent.
Id. See also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194-205 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (tracing the history of the PTO's and the courts' widely varying treatment of
computer programs during the 1960s and 1970s).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
43. See Conceptual Severance, supra note 2 (discussing the differing protec-
tion accorded computer hardware, software, and algorithms; arguing for the aban-
donment of the patentable subject matter physicality requirement and for the
extension of patentability to software and algorithms; and further recommending a
high standard of innovation as the means to avoid overprotection).
44. Benson, 409 U.S. at 63, 67. One commentator has urged that the interde-
pendence of hardware and software, especially in computer chip design, has ren-
dered any legal distinction between the two components of computers meaningless.
See Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1055.
45. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1242-45
(3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a computer program for managing a dental office was
protected as a copyrightable expression of an idea, although the idea itself was not
protectable).
46. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
47. Id.
48. Claim 8 read:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into bi-
nary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a
binary '1 in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary T in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1' to the first position of said register,
13
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or machinery.49 The Court questioned whether a mathematical
formula, having no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer, could be patented.50 It de-
clared that such mathematical formulas were unpatentable,
reasoning that algorithms are ideas, which are unpatentable
under § 101, 51 and merely implementing the algorithm on a
computer does not make it a patentable "process."52 The Court
further reasoned that if algorithms were deemed processes, it
would be impossible to canvass prior art, which, for computer
programs, is vast and documented poorly. 53 The Court con-
cluded that the problems relating to software patentability
could only be solved by Congress.5 4 However, because the Court
in Benson narrowed its holding to a proscription against patent-
ing mathematical algorithms, doubt remained whether the Ben-
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation
for a succeeding binary T in the second position of said register.
Id. at 73-74. Claim 13 read:
A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number rep-
resentations into binary number representations comprising the steps of
(1) testing each binary digit position '1,' beginning with the least significant
binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation for
a binary '0' or a binary '1';
(2) if a binary '0' is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary T is detected, adding a binary '1' at the (i+l)th and (i+3)th
the least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant deci-
mal digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant deci-
mal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser
significant decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execu-
tion of steps (1) through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal
digit representation has been so processed.
Id. at 74.
49. Id. at 64.
50. Id. at 71-72.
51. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
52. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
53. Id. at 71 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra
note 41, at 13).
54. Id. at 73.
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son logic, if not the holding, prohibited computer program
patenting generally.55
2. Requiring Physical Transformation for Processes
Involving Mathematical Algorithms
The Supreme Court elaborated on the Benson proscription
against patenting pure mathematical algorithms in Parker v.
Flook56 and Diamond v. Diehr,57 which collectively circum-
scribed what may be termed a "physicality requirement"58 for
processes that contain mathematical algorithms. In Parker v.
Flook,59 Flook had applied for a patent on a "Method for Updat-ing Alarm Limits," the only novel feature of which was a mathe-
matical formula.60 The issue was whether the claim escaped
the Benson result by virtue of subsequently using the computer-
ized results to set alarm limits-a "practical application."61
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, declared that post-so-
lution application of algorithms, such as the subsequent appli-
cation of the algorithm to the catalytic process in Flook, does
not constitute patentable "inventive application."6 2
55. See, e.g., In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (discussing an applica-
tion to patent a computer program that changes the input mode from sequential to
one that does not depend on the input order). "There is no indication that 'al-
gorithm,' as used by appellants, means 'mathematical algorithm' as that term has
been used by the Supreme Court. Therefore, appellants' use of the term to de-
scribe their invention is not an admission that they are claiming nonstatutory sub-
ject matter." Id. at 915-16.
56. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
57. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
58. The requirement of physical transformation for processes involving math-
ematical algorithms has been termed the "physicality requirement." Conceptual
Severance, supra note 2, at 1058. See generally Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive
Patentable Software: Are There Still Diehr or Was it Just a Flook?, 6 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 363 (1993) (examining the roots of the physicality requirement for software
patentability and suggesting the abandonment of the requirement in favor of a
normative approach that considers software execution speed and performance).
See also Conceptual Severance, supra note 2, at 1064 (urging the abandonment of
the physicality requirement and suggesting broader patent protection for
software).
59. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
60. Id. at 585. An "alarm limit" is a number which corresponds to conditions
that could lead to problems during catalytic conversion processes. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 594.
15
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The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conven-
tional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable princi-
ple into a patentable process exalts form over substance....
... Whether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at
the time of the claimed invention . . . , it is treated as though it
were a familiar part of the prior art .... 63
According to Justice Stevens and the majority, the discovery of
a well-known phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula
"cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive
concept in its application."" Justice Stevens' approach was crit-
icized in a dissent by Justice Stewart, who recognized that the
prior art issue, i.e., the inventiveness inquiry, was separate and
distinct from, and irrelevant to, the patentable subject matter
issue.6 5 "[The Court's opinion strikes a] damaging blow at basic
principles of patent law by importing the criteria of novelty and
inventiveness which require examination of the prior art into
considerations of subject matter patentability."6
In contrast to Flook, the Court declared a claim, which as-
serted a computer-implemented mathematical formula, patent-
able in Diamond v. Diehr.67 In Diehr, the patent applicant
sought to patent a process for curing synthetic rubber.6s The
Court was confronted with deciding whether the novel and non-
obvious combination of a well known mathematical formula
with a computer and well known manufacturing process steps
could constitute patentable subject matter.69 The Court held
that, although mathematical formulas are not themselves pat-
entable, a claim nevertheless asserts patentable subject matter
if it implements or applies a mathematical formula in a struc-
ture or process that, as a whole, performs a function the patent
laws were designed to protect.70
63. Id. at 590-92.
64. Id. at 594.
65. Id. at 599-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehn-
quist, J.).
66. Id.
67. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
68. Id. at 175.
69. Id. at 188.
70. Id. at 191-92.
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That respondents' claims involve the transformation of an article,
in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state
or thing cannot be disputed.... Industrial processes such as this
are the types which have historically been eligible to receive the
protection of our patent laws....
Our conclusion ... is not altered by the fact that in several
steps of the process a mathematical equation and a programmed
digital computer are used.71
In combination with Benson and Flook, the Court thereby estab-
lished that processes comprising the transformation of some-
thing physical into a different state or thing constitute
patentable subject matter, and the inclusion of a mathematical
formula does not necessarily render such a process
unpatentable. 72
C. The Freeman7 -Walter 74-Abele75 Mathematical Algorithm
Analysis
Concurrent with the Supreme Court's Flook76 and Deihr77
decisions, the C.C.P.A. developed an approach to mathematical
algorithm patentability analysis consisting of a two-part test
71. Id. at 184-85.
72. Id. A four member dissent was not satisfied with the guidance given by
the majority and was concerned that the majority's language might cause
processes to be improperly denominated unpatentable algorithms. Id. at 219 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). In his dissent, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined, Justice Stevens declared:
First, the cases considering the patentability of program-related inventions
do not establish rules that enable a conscientious patent lawyer to deter-
mine with a fair degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related inven-
tions will be patentable. Second, the inclusion of the ambiguous concept of
an "algorithm" within the "law of nature" category of unpatentable subject
matter has given rise to the concern that almost any process might be so
described and therefore held unpatentable.
Id. Some commentators have focused on the industrial application aspect of the
Court's holding. See, e.g., The Case Against Patent Protection, supra note 4, at
1094-1102. "From the opening sentence of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in the
Diehr case, the industrial nature of the Diehr process is repeatedly hammered
home." Id. at 1094. However, the transformative aspect of the invention and the
industrial aspect substantially overlapped. See id. at 1089.
73. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
74. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
75. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
76. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).




based on a series of three cases.78 In In re Freeman,79 the patent
applicant appealed a B.P.A.I. rejection of claims that recited a
computer-based control system for a conventional phototypeset-
ter.80 The C.C.P.A. promulgated a two-part test for determining
whether an algorithm in the claims preempted nonstatutory
subject matter:81
First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indi-
rectly recites an 'algorithm' in the Benson sense of that term, for a
claim which fails even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly
preempt an algorithm. Second, the claim must be further ana-
lyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that
algorithm.8 2
Applying the first part of the test,8 3 the court determined that
algorithms were not recited in the method or apparatus
claims. s4 Because the claims did not "satisfy" the first part of
the test, which required that the claim directly or indirectly re-
cite an algorithm, the court did not reach the second part of the
test, which would have required the court to determine whether
there was improper preemption.8 5 As a result, the court re-
versed the PTO rejection.8 6
The court's language in Freeman, stating the test in terms
of "preemption," was questioned in In re Walter,8 7 where the ap-
plicant had claimed an invention for cross-correlating and un-
scrambling jumbled signals returning from the transmission of
78. Arrhythmia Research Technology v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
Determination of statutory subject matter has been conveniently conducted
in two stages, following a protocol initiated by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); modified
after the Court's Flook decision by In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A.
1980); and again after the Court's Diehr decision by In re Abele, 684 F.2d
902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058 (parallel citations omitted).
79. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
80. Id. at 1238-40, 1242.
81. Id. at 1245.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1246-47.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.PA. 1980).
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seismic chirps into the earth during surveying.88 The court ap-
plied both parts of the Freeman test and declared the subject
matter of the application unpatentable.8 9 Applying the first
part of the Freeman test, the claims were held to recite a mathe-
matical algorithm because "correlation or cross-correlation is a
mathematical exercise which relates two mathematical func-
tions."9° The court then clarified or modified the second part of
the test by stating:
If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a
specific manner to define structural relationships ... the claim
being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster under § 101.
If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented and
solved by the claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and
Flook, and is not applied in any manner to physical elements or
process steps, no amount of post-solution activity will render the
claim statutory; nor is it saved by a preamble merely reciting the
field of use of the mathematical algorithm.9'
The court concluded that the claims did not recite methods or
apparatus for seismic prospecting, but rather they recited
mathematical methods for interpreting seismic prospecting re-
sults. 92 Just as in Flook, the end use of the results did not save
the claims from a subject matter rejection.93 Furthermore, the
court echoed Freeman in stating that means-plus-function lan-
guage would not overcome a § 10194 subject matter rejection
simply by virtue of describing the invention as a "physical" ap-
paratus.95 The claims were rejected because they recited math-
ematical algorithms under the first step of the test and because
the claims did not implement the algorithms to define struc-
tural relationships or physical process steps as required by the
second step of the test.96
88. Id. at 760-62.
89. Id. at 767-71.
90. Id. at 769.
91. Id. at 767.
92. Id. at 769.
93. Id.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
95. Walter, 618 F.2d at 768. "If the fimctionally-defined disclosed means and
their equivalents are so broad that they encompass any and every means for per-
forming the recited functions, the apparatus claim is an attempt to exalt form over
substance since the claim is really to the method or series of functions itself." Id.




The second part of the two-part test was further modified or
explained in In re Abele.97 In that case, the applicant's claims
asserted a computed tomography improvement that reduced ex-
posure to x-rays and improved the reliability of the resulting
image.98 The applicants criticized the Walter formulation as
presenting opposite ends of a patentable subject matter spec-
trum, while providing little guidance as to determinations
within the vast gray area between those opposite ends.99 The
court conceded the force of the argument and endeavored to fur-
ther clarify the second part of the test, declaring:
Walter should be read as requiring no more than that the al-
gorithm be "applied in any manner to physical elements or pro-
cess steps," provided that its application is circumscribed by more
than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution activ-
ity. Thus, if the claim would be "otherwise statutory,". . . albeit
inoperative or less useful without the algorithm, the claim like-
wise presents statutory subject matter when the algorithm is
included.100
The court asserted that this view was consistent with the
Supreme Court's Benson and Diehr decisions and with earlier
C.C.P.A. decisions, 101 particularly Freeman.102 After concluding
that the claims satisfied the first part of the test by reciting an
algorithm, the court applied the second part of the test and re-
jected the claims that were not "applied in any manner to physi-
cal elements" 103 while allowing the "production, detection, and
display steps," 10 4 which were not dictated by the algorithm. 105
97. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
98. Id. at 903.
99. Id. at 906-07.
100. Id. at 907 (citing Walter, 618 F.2d at 769).
101. Id.
102. Abele, 684 F.2d at 905.
103. Id. at 907.
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D. "Means-Plus-Function" Claims-The Drafting Tool
Provided in Title 35, United States Code, § 112,
Paragraph 6, 1o and Its Interpretation by the
C. C.P.A.l 0 7
Practitioners and commentators have developed several ap-
proaches to satisfying the Benson, Flook, and Diehr require-
ment of physical transformation for processes that involve
mathematical algorithms. Such approaches usually entail link-
ing the algorithm or program with otherwise patentable subject
matter to pigeon-hole the invention into a statutory category,
including a "machine" or a physical "process."08 The most
prominent approach is to define programs as "computer means
for" performing operations, using "means-plus-function"
claims. 0 9 Title 35, United States Code, § 112, paragraph 6
states:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the reci-
tal of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, ma-
terial, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof. 110
The type of claim that uses the form sanctioned by 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 is called a "means-plus-function" claim because a "means"
106. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
107. See generally R. Carl Moy, The Interpretation of Means Expressions
During Prosecution, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 246 (1986) (describing
how the C.C.PA. interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6).
108. Stephen A. Becker, Drafting Patent Applications on Computer-Imple-
mented Inventions, 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 237 (1991). Computer program claim
forms have included means-plus-function claims, hardware-specific claims, method
claims, and the inclusion of flowcharts or pseudo-code. Id. at 255-56. Compare the
protection offered by the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 901-914 (Supp. III 1985). See also Scott M. Alter & Victor W. Marton, The Re-
birth of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act: An analysis of Brooktree Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 222 (1993) (discussing the first
decision of the Federal Circuit concerning infringement under the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act, rendered on October 9, 1992, and opining that the decision
increased the status of the Act as a means of protecting semiconductor chips).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see infra parts II.D and HII.D for discussion of means-
plus-function claim format and its effect on computer software patentability. See
also McKelvey, supra note 2; Becker, supra note 108,
110. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
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is recited in the claim and is defined within the claim by how it
functions, rather than by its structure."1
Until recently, considerable doubt existed about whether
the PTO must construe means-plus-function claims to cover
structures in the specification and their equivalents when mak-
ing patentability determinations.12 The C.C.P.A. left a legacy
of several decisions involving means-plus-function claims in
which the court may have declined to seek structure in the spec-
ification despite the applicant's urging after a PTO patentabil-
ity rejection. 113 However, the C.C.P.A. also left a seemingly
contrary legacy of several patentability decisions in which the
court did construe "means" in means-plus-function claims to
cover the structure in the specification." 4 A review of this
111. See MERGES, supra note 23, at 79. For example, "means for fastening...
would include nails, scotch tape, screws, glue, Velcro, and any other 'means for'
attaching one thing to another. In this claim, the 'function' is fastening, and the
'means for fastening' element of the claim therefore includes many means for doing
this task." Id.
112. See infra part II.E.2.
113. In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See also infra notes 180-
87 and accompanying text; In re Sweet, 393 F.2d 837 (C.C.P.A. 1968), infra notes
144-50 and accompanying text; In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957), infra
notes 134-43 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789
(C.C.PA. 1982) (means-plus-function claims asserting an apparatus for determin-
ing malfunction probabilities in complex systems rejected under § 101 as asserting
a mathematical algorithm without the court addressing the 35 U.S.C. § 112, para-
graph 6, direction to reference structures in the specification); In re Mott, 1557
F.2d 266, 267, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (declining to survey the specification for struc-
ture corresponding to "locking means" for a ball valve, stating that such an inquiry
"misses the point" of whether a prior art structure is encompassed by the function
recited in the claims for purposes of a § 102 novelty inquiry); In re Margaroli, 318
F.2d 348, 349-51 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (in affirming a § 103 obviousness rejection of a
machine that oriented dates on a conveyer belt for subsequent pitting, the C.C.P.A.
refused to import limitations from the specification to narrow the claimed "vibra-
tion means" and avoid the prior art).
114. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1238-40, 1242 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see supra notes
79-86 and accompanying text. See also In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 149 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (finding structure in the specification determinative in concluding that
means-plus-flnction claims sufficiently pointed out and distinctly claimed the in-
vention, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2, although unclear whether
the structure in the specification supported the court's finding of statutory subject
matter); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1396, 1399 (C.C.PA 1969) (asserting that
the PTO erred in declaring means-plus-flmction claims, which asserted a device to
automatically create a two-dimensional display of a three-dimensional object, un-
patentable subject matter when the specification revealed structure in the form of
mechanical drafting machines, which were within the prior art); In re Henatsch,
298 F.2d 954, 954-55, 958 (CC.P.A 1962) (looking to the specification of a side-
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C.C.P.A. precedent is appropriate because C.C.P.A. decisions
are binding on the Federal Circuit, which can overrule C.C.P.A.
precedent only by sitting en banc.115
Prior to 1946, the courts regularly referred to patent speci-
fications when interpreting claims, in part because the require-
ment of adequate disclosure in the specification had developed
long before the requirement of claims had developed. 116 In
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,117 Judge Newman
cited several representative cases, including The Corn-planter
Patent,"8 which far predated the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 6 in the Patent Act of 1952119 and which illustrated
the trend toward greater reliance on the claims.120
The Court explained in The Corn Planter Patent that a clause
such as "substantially as set forth" throws us back to the specifi-
cation for a qualification of the claim, and the several elements of
which the combination is composed. To this extent early claim
form was a precursor of the "means-plus-function" form of today,
in that they both incorporate by reference the description in the
specification and equivalents thereof.121
walk canopy invention for structure that would limit the corresponding means-
plus-function claims to avoid reading on the prior art, but finding no such means
that would distinguish the invention).
115. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en
banc) (Federal Circuit, en banc, announcing in its first case that the precedent of
the C.C.P.A. would be binding on the Federal Circuit and that any conflict with
such precedent could be resolved by the court sitting en banc). To the extent that
conflict exists within C.C.PA. precedent, later C.C.PA. decisions sub silentio over-
rule previous inconsistencies because the C.C.PA. always sat en banc. In re Gos-
telti, 872 F.2d. 1008, 1009, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (regarding a § 102 anticipation
rejection of a patent for chemical intermediates used in antibiotics synthesis).
116. For a general history of 35 U.S.C. § 112, see Irving et al., supra note 29.
See also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Newman, J., commenting) (reviewing the historical development of the doctrine of
equivalents, the reverse doctrine of equivalents, and 35 U.S.C. § 112). The claim
requirement is 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2. See supra text accompanying note 33
for further discussion of the claim requirement.
117. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
118. Brown v. Guild (The Corn-planter Patent), 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 181 (1874).
119. Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
120. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 958 (Newman, J., commenting).
121. Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
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Section 112, paragraph 6122 was enacted partially in re-
sponse to the 1946 patent infringement case, Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.'m In Halliburton, the Supreme
Court reviewed functional claims of an acoustical resonator that
facilitated the determination of oil well depths by, in effect,
counting regularly spaced oil tubing joints between the surface
and a subterranean point on the oil tube to yield a distance that
served as a reference for further measurements.12 The Court
examined one of the functional claims' 25 and observed that
"[t]he language of the claim thus describes [a] most crucial ele-
ment.. . in terms of what it will do rather than in terms of its
own physical characteristics or its arrangement in the new com-
bination apparatus."126 Despite the presence of a specific appa-
ratus in the specification, the Court rejected the functional
claims, asserting that they made the patent rights broader than
those which would have resulted had the applicant claimed the
invention in structural terms.127 The Court found significant
that the functional language occurred at "the point of nov-
122. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
123. 329 U.S. 1 (1946). See also Paul M. Janicke, Means-Plus-Function
Claims in Modern Patent Law, C785 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 297, 301-08 (1992) (providing
thorough analysis of Halliburton as the origin of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6).
124. Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12.
125. The Court examined the first claim, which it deemed typical of the re-
maining claims. In pertinent part, claim 1 stated:
In an apparatus for determining the location of an obstruction in a well hav-
ing therein a string of assembling tubing sections inter-connected with each
other by coupling collars, means . . for creating a pressure impulse in said
well, echo receiving means... for receiving pressure impulses from the well
... and means ... for tuning said receiving means to the frequency of echoes
from the tubing collars of said tubing sections to clearly distinguish the ech-
oes from said couplings from each other.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. The Court stated:
[I]f Walker's blanket claims be valid, no device to clarify echo waves, now
known or hereafter invented, whether the device be an actual equivalent of
Walker's ingredient or not, could be used in a combination such as this, dur-
ing the life of Walker's patent. Had Walker accurately described the
machine he claims to have invented, he would have had no such broad
rights to bar the use of all devices now or hereafter known which could ac-
cent waves .... [A] patentee cannot obtain greater coverage by failing to
describe his invention than by describing it as the statute commands.
Id. at 12-13. The Court has been criticized for its characterization of the claims as
"inaccurate" descriptions. See Janicke, supra note 123, at 306-07.
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elty."128 The phrase, "point of novelty," is shorthand for that as-
pect of the invention that is different from the prior art.129
Congress responded to the Halliburton decision by enacting
what is now Title 35, United States Code, § 112, paragraph 6 in
the Patent Act of 1952,130 which states that "[a]n element in a
claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function . . . , and such claim shall be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof."131
[Tihe problem [in Halliburton] was unfortunately obscured by the Court's
grounding of its decision on a supposed indefiniteness of functional lan-
guage. There was no sound reason to think that Walker's phrasing was in-
definite, whether at the "point of novelty" or anywhere else. What made it
seem indefinite was the inability of the law to address adequately the ques-
tion of how much scope a patent claim should have.
Id. at 307. In addition, the Court overlooked the patentee's express argument that
the "means" in the claims referred to structures in the specification and their
equivalents, a more narrow interpretation than the Court's ultimate interpreta-
tion that the claims asserted rights over all structure capable of performing the
recited function. Id.
128. Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 8. The Court phrased the issue of the case: "We
must, however, determine whether, as petitioner charges, the claims here held
valid run afoul... because they do not describe the invention but use 'conveniently
functional language at the exact point of novelty.'" Id. (quoting General Elec. Co.
v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 372 (1938) (further explaining that
"Congress requires, for the protection of the public, that the inventor set out a
definite limitation of his patent; that condition must be satisfied before the monop-
oly is granted")).
129. See generally Comment, 35 U.S.C. 101 Claim Analysis-The Point of
Novelty Approach, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 521 (1980). See also Irah H. Donner, Two
Decades of Gottschalk v. Benson: Putting the "Rithm" Back Into the Patenting of
Mathematical Algorithms," 5 Sos-rwAR L.J. 419 (1992) (describing the turbulent
history of the point of novelty approach prior to its ultimate rejection in Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)); In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1244 (C.C.P.A. 1978)
(rejecting the point of novelty approach in relation to obviousness under § 103, as
well as patentable subject matter under § 101).
130. Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. H 1990)).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The reference to "equivalents thereof" seemed to invoke
the doctrine of equivalents, a judge-made equitable doctrine under which claims
are interpreted beyond their literal meaning to encompass that which "performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain [substan-
tially] the same result." Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605,
607 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
The doctrine was created to balance the public interest in knowing the precise
limits of an invention against the applicant's interest in obtaining a fair reading of
claims, where a literal reading would produce an inequitable result. See generally
William E. Eshelman, Comment, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Post-
25
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Congress thereby clearly sanctioned the increasing use of
means-plus-function format, which was viewed as particularly
necessary in complex mechanical claims, 3 2 and effectively over-
ruled the Court's decision in Halliburton.'33
In the 1957 patentability case, In re Lundberg,34 the
C.C.P.A. promulgated a constructional rule for interpreting
means-plus-function claims that seemingly contradicted Con-
gress' intent, as expressed through 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph
6.135 The C.C.P.A. affirmed the B.P.A.I.'s prior art136 rejection of
an apparatus and method for performing geophysical explora-
tion by airplane. 37 The claims had described the invention in
terms of conventional equipment "adapted" to perform allegedly
Pennwalt Developments, 65 TuL. L. REv. 883 (1991). The doctrine of equivalents
existed long before the Patent Act of 1952. Sean T. Moorhead, Note, The Doctrine
of Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-Literal Infringement or the Second Prong of
Patent Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421, 1425-26 (1992) (citing Wi-
nans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853), as the origin of the doctrine of
equivalents). However, it has been asserted that the 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6
doctrine of equivalents analysis differs from the original "equitable" doctrine in
that 35 U.S.C. § 112 equivalency requires that the accused device perform literally
the same function, whereas the equitable doctrine requires that the accused device
perform substantially the same function. See Janicke, supra note 123, at 318, 325
(citing Pennwalt, 833 F.2d 931, as suggesting the difference in the two doctrine of
equivalents analyses and citing Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533,
1536 (Fed. Cir. 1991), as suggesting that the equitable doctrine of equivalents
might permit a finding of infringement by allowing the patentee "in the right cir-
cumstances... to go outside the recited function"). The Federal Circuit warned
against an overly expansive equivalency reading of claims in Greiner & Co. v.
Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (asserting that the doctrine of
equivalents is the exception, not the rule).
132. Irving et al., supra note 29, at 626. "The last paragraph, which is the
current section's sixth paragraph, did not have statutory precedent. Rather, it re-
flected a growing use of 'means-plus-function' language in claims involving com-
plex mechanical devices. For these complex inventions, requiring structural
recital proved to be too confining." Id.
133. Pasquale J. Federico, COMMENTARY ON THE NEW PATENT AcT, 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 25 (West 1954), reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161
(1993).
134. 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
135. In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957). See also Pennwalt, 833
F.2d at 959 (Newman, J., commenting) (citing In re Lundberg as a transition to
stricter reliance on the claims in defining the limits of inventions).
136. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (explaining that the nov-
elty and nonobviousness patentability inquiries call for comparison to prior art).
137. Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 543.
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novel and nonobvious functions.138 The applicants argued that
the claims' format was analogous to the means-plus-function
format sanctioned by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, under
which such claims were to be construed "to cover the corre-
sponding structure . . . described in the specification and
equivalents thereof."139 Accepting the analogy but observing
that the prior art suggested both the structure and function de-
scribed in the claims, the court declared that the only way the
invention could overcome the prior art would be if the court
were to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 as directing the
court to read limitations from the specification into the
claims. 140 The court refused. 141
[N]otwithstanding the third [now sixth] paragraph of section 112,
it is the language itself of the claims which must particularly
point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the appli-
cant regards as his invention, without limitations imported from
the specification, whether such language is couched in terms of
138. Id. at 544-45. Claim 54 is an example of how the invention was claimed
as conventional equipment "adapted" to perform novel functions:
Apparatus for geophysical exploration from the air comprising, the combina-
tion with a maneuverable airplane adapted to transport an operating crew
and the hereinafter recited equipment, of a magnetic detecting instrument
carried by the airplane and adapted while in the air automatically to receive
and respond to with a sensitivity of one gamma or less magnetic effects of
earth anomalies related to mineral deposits, a support for said detecting in-
strument carried by the airplane in operative association with the detecting
instrument and adapted automatically to stabilize the latter in relation to
level and orientation regardless of motions of the airplane, and a record
making device also carried by the airplane in operative association with the
detecting instrument and adapted simultaneously to make a record of the
said effects of the said anomalies to which the detecting instrument
responds.
Id.
139. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 546. The applicants of-
fered to substitute "means" for "adapted" in the claims, but the court assumed
without deciding that they were analogous. Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 546.
140. Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 547. The court stated:
[U]nless the above recited clause in the third paragraph of section 112 is to
be construed to mean that, though the claims as drawn read on the prior art,
both as to function and structure, the claims may, through the medium of a
"means" clause, be held to include the limitations which... are set forth in
the disclosure, we must reject appellants' contentions as to the effect of sec-
tion 112 on the claims in this case.
141. Id. at 548.
27
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means plus function or consists of a detailed recitation of the in-
ventive matter. Limitations in the specification not included in
the claim may not be relied upon to impart patentability to an
otherwise unpatentable claim.1 42
The court continued with its analysis by comparing the prior art
only to the applicant's claims and ultimately declared that the
prior art suggested the invention, rendering it unpatentable. 143
The C.C.P.A. again refused to import limitations from the
specification in the 1968 case, In re Sweet,'" which was an ap-
peal from a § 103145 obviousness rejection of means-plus-func-
tion claims directed to lathe tandem cutting tools that could be
simultaneously adjusted for varying diameters. 146 The turning
apparatus combination claim recited, inter alia, "means to si-
multaneously change the position of said cutting elements for
cutting a different size diameter whereby said cutting elements
will cut at substantially the same distance from the center of
rotation on said different size diameter."147 The court stated
that "a recitation of 'means' for performing a function is inter-
142. Id.
143. Id. at 549-51. In Pennwalt, Judge Newman observed that the Lundberg
court's refusal to include limitations from the specification was part of a trend to-
ward greater reliance on the claims as complete declarations of the patent rights.
Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 959 (Newman, J., commenting).
This practice is in sharp contrast with that of the 19th and early 20th centu-
ries. There was a gradual, erratic, but inexorable transition to the require-
ment that the claims contain sufficient detail so that they can stand alone,
without reliance on the specification to show distinctions from the prior art.
Id.
144. 393 F.2d 837 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
146. Sweet, 393 F.2d at 841. The court analyzed claim 1 as a representative
claim, which read:
In a turning apparatus combination having a workpiece center of rotation
and a cross slide; a tandem cutting tool, comprising a tool holder, at least
two cutting elements carried by said holder in closely spaced relation one
above the other to cut simultaneously at substantially the same distance
from the lathe's center of rotation, each successive cutting element being
offset from the one immediately thereabove in the direction of tool feed to
provide a total cut per revolution of the workpiece corresponding to the sum
of the cuts of the cutting elements and means to simultaneously change the
position of said cutting elements for cutting a different size diameter
whereby said cutting elements will cut at substantially the same distance
from the center of rotation on said different size diameter.
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preted broadly to cover all means capable of performing the
stated function and is not limited to the particular structure
which the application may disclose."1'8 The court agreed with
the B.P.A.I. that, construed broadly, the claims recited matter
that was obvious in light of prior art.149 Accordingly, the patent
was rejected as obvious under § 103.150
In the 1973 case, In re Knowlton,'5 the court scrutinized an
application for a computer-based invention that determined
commonality and correlated a data list.152 The court sought to
determine whether the structures in the specification that cor-
responded to a "means" in the claim satisfied the disclosure re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.1-5 Without citing
Lundberg or Sweet, the C.C.P.A. held that 35 U.S.C. § 112, par-
agraph 6 was binding on the PTO.154 The court stated that, "[ilf
the applicant chooses to use such language, the statute in-
structs the interpreter of the claims, e.g., the Patent Office or
the courts, as to how such language shall be interpreted." 55
The C.C.P.A. interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6156
even more liberally in the 1980 action, Hale Fire Pump Co. v.
Tokai, Ltd. 15 7 In Hale,158 a patentee claimed infringement of his
centrifugal trash pump patent.159 The court found that the in-
vention's "releasable means" for the suction and discharge sec-
148. Id. at 841-42.
149. Id. at 842.
150. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 103.
151. 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).




156. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
157. 614 F.2d 1278 (C.C.PA. 1980).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1279. The court focused on claim 1, which stated:
A centrifugal pump comprising a casing having an intake side with at least
one inlet port and a discharge side with a discharge port, a unitary volute
assembly consisting of a suction volute section and a discharge volute sec-
tion, an impeller mounted for rotation about a predetermined axis and re-
leasable means having means for moving said volute assembly into an
assembled position interiorly of the casing and for moving said volute as-
sembly into a disassembled position whereby on releasing of said releasable
means alone permitting complete disassembly of said volute assembly from
said casing and any other interior parts of said pump.




tion assembly was a key feature of the invention.1 60 The court
sought the structure in the specification corresponding to the
releasable means for the purpose of determining whether the
alleged infringer's pump was covered by the patent claims. 161
The court stated that, "according to section 112, 'means for'
claims are not to be read in a vacuum and can only be construed
by reference to the specification. ... Here, the determinant for
the coverage of claim 1 is the structure shown in the specifica-
tion which corresponds to a releasable means, and any
'equivalents thereof.' "162 Finding that the structure in the spec-
ification narrowed the reach of the claims, the court declared
that the accused pumps did not infringe the patent.163
E. The Treatment of Means-Plus-Function Format in
Computer Program and Mathematical Algorithm
Claims'64
1. C.C.P.A. Analysis
In the 1960s and 1970s, while several C.C.P.A. decisions
variously upheld the patentability of means-plus-function
claims directed to physical apparatus, 165 inventors began using
means-plus-function claims to link software to generic com-
puter hardware, making the claims appear to recite structure or
machine. 16 In early response, the President's Commission on
the Patent System, which was formed in 1965 to review the is-
160. Id. at 1279.
161. Id. at 1283.
162. Id. at 1283 n.5.
163. Id. at 1283-84.
164. See also generally Moy, supra note 107.
165. E.g., Hale Fire Pump Co. v. Tokai, Ltd., 614 F.2d 1278 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(indefiniteness rejection of a centrifugal trash pump). See also In re Farrow, 554
F.2d 468, 472-73 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (indefiniteness rejection of a filter assembly with
"means to introduce a fluid to be filtered or withdraw a filtered fluid ... [and]
means to place the aperture of at least one element in a fluid-tight manner within
the external housing"); In re Mott, 539 F.2d 1291, 1293, 1299 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (en-
ablement inquiry regarding a ball-type valve tool with a "locking means" to releas-
ably hold the valve open); In re Engler, 371 F.2d 508, 510-11 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(drawbar improvement for connecting a tractor to traction apparatus with "means
engaging [a rod and clevis] to urge the drawbar downwardly with respect to said
traction apparatus"); Santini v. Burgy, 318 F.2d 344,347 (C.C.PA. 1963) (infringe-
ment action of a "motor means" and "control means" for stopping and reversing
elevator cars).
166. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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sue of computer program patentability, condemned the use of
"means for" language as adding confusion to computer program
patentability determinations. 167
Indirect attempts to obtain patents [on computer programs] and
avoid [a § 1011 rejection, by drafting claims as . .. a machine or
components thereof programmed in a given manner, rather than
as a program itself, have confused the issue further and should
not be permitted.168
Subsequently, the 1968 PTO Guidelines claimed that, consis-
tent with regarding substance over form, the PTO would re-
quire some physical transformation or manipulation as a
patentable subject matter requirement. 169 As a talisman to
combat the liberal construction of mathematical algorithm and
computer program means-plus-function claims, the PTO
wielded the Benson170 precedent that formulas or algorithms
lacking substantial practical application except in conjunction
with a computer are unpatentable. 171 The C.C.P.A. seemed con-
vinced despite its own concurrent trend toward searching the
specification for means-plus-function structure in mechanical
apparatus applications. 172
The C.C.P.A. most prominently analyzed computer means-
plus-function claims in In re Freeman.173 In Freeman, the
B.P.A.I. had rejected computer-related claims as unpatentable
167. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 14.
168. Id.
169. Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs: Notice of Is-
suance of Guidelines, 33 Fed. Reg. 15609 (1968).
170. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
171. Id. at 71-72; see also supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
173. 573 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Freeman was discussed in refer-
ence to the Freeman-Walter-Abele two-part test. See supra notes 79-86 and accom-
panying text. The first claim is representative:
1. In a computer display system comprising
(A) a display device for generating relatively-positioned symbol images
in response to applied sequences of signals specifying the shape and posi-
tion of said images,
(B) a data processor comprising
(1) means for storing a first plurality of data sequences, each describ-
ing individual symbols, and a second plurality of data sequences cor-
responding to a control program,
(2) means responsive to said control program for nondestructively
reading from said means for storing and transferring to said display




"mental steps" under Benson.174 On appeal, the B.P.A.I. de-
fended its Benson-based rationale to the C.C.P.A. and further
argued that the novelty of the invention impermissibly resided
in the computer program.175 The court rejected the B.P.A.I.'s
argument as improperly applying the point of novelty approach
to statutory subject matter, stating that the court had "indi-
cated the inappropriateness of the 'point of novelty' approach in
determining whether a claimed invention is statutory subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."176 The court concluded that the
apparatus claims were distinguishable from method claims and
that they indeed recited patentable subject matter.177 However,
the court emphasized that the claims were saved from a Benson
rejection, not by the means-plus-function form, but by virtue of
bona fide apparatus and the absence of a nonstatutory al-
gorithm. 178 The court cautioned that, "[tihough a claim ex-
pressed in 'means for' (functional) terms is said to be an
apparatus claim, the subject matter as a whole of that claim
may be indistinguishable from that of a method claim drawn to
the steps performed by the 'means.'-179
The reasoning of the court in Freeman was subsequently
followed, but to an opposite result, in In re Maucorps,180 in
which the C.C.P.A. rejected an applicant's claims of a "Comput-
ing System for Optimizing Sales Organizations and Activi-
ties."1'8 The invention used computer modeling to determine
(3) means responsive to said control program for generating and
transferring to said display device data sequences specifying the de-
sired position of at least a first one of said selected data sequences,
the improvement comprising means for storing additional informa-
tion specifying spatial coordinate positions, relative to a reference
point on a corresponding symbol, of a plurality of concatenation
points associated with said corresponding symbol, and means respon-
sive to said control program for generating and transferring to said
display device data signals specifying the coincidence of at least one
specified concatenation points on adjacent symbols.
Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1240-41.
174. Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1242.
175. Id. at 1243.
176. Id. (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 1247.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
181. Id. at 481.
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the optimum number of sales representatives and managers re-
quired for a particular marketing area. 1 2 Although the appli-
cant described the invention as an apparatus, using means-
plus-fumction form, the only physical "means" in the invention
was the reference to a general purpose computer, specified as a
"means ... including electric circuits," to run the program. 83
The court relied on Freeman in declaring that the 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, paragraph 6 authorization of means-plus-function format
"cannot rescue appellant's claims from the requirements of
§ 101."184 Stating that the means-plus-function claims en-
veloped "each and every means for carrying out a solution tech-
nique," 8 5 the court declared that the claims preempted
mathematical algorithms, rendering the claims unpatentable
subject matter under Benson 8 6 and Flook.187
182. Id. at 482.
183. Id. at 483. The first claim is illustrative and was the only independent
claim:
1. A computing system for processing data to determine an optimum "cod-
ing," defined as the number of regular visits over a predetermined period of
time, Pd, by a business representative to a client, to be selected for such
client, comprising:
(a) means for calculating for each different value of x representing the
coding of clients, a value for y representing the sales arising over said
predetermined period of time... ;
(b) means for calculating, for the value of x = 1 representing the coding
of clients, a value for y representing the sales arising over said predeter-
mined period of time... ;
(c) means for calculating for the value of x = 2 representing the coding of
clients, a value for y representing the sales arising over said predeter-
mined period of time from the representative's activity... ;
(d) means for calculating for each different value of x a value for y...;
and
(e) means responsive to the output of said calculating means .... each of
said calculating means including electric circuits constituted so that
when said electric circuits are in an activated state, values of y are auto-
matically calculated upon receiving the necessary input data regarding
the above-defined variables, and.., value selecting means likewise in-
cluding electric circuits constituted so that, when said selecting means is
in an activating state, a value of x will be automatically selected upon
said means receiving the necessary minimum sales line and saturation
curve data.
Id. at 482-83.
184. Id. at 486.
185. Id.
186. Maucorps, 609 F.2d at 486. "[Alppellant's claimed invention as a whole
comprises each and every means for carrying out a solution technique for a set of
33
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2. Federal Circuit Decisions
Unlike the C.C.P.A., the Federal Circuit has consistently
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 11218 as requiring the claim interpreter
to determine the statutory nature of the "means" claims with
reference to the specification. 8 9 In In re Iwahashi,190 the Fed-
eral Circuit reversed a PTO § 101191 patentable subject matter
rejection of an "Auto-Correlation Unit," which performed recog-
nition of signals such as voices, and which was claimed by a
combination of elements stated in means-plus-function form in
addition to one element directed to Read Only Memory
(ROM). 192 The PTO Solicitor had argued that the means-plus-
function claim at issue must be read to encompass every means
capable of performing the recited function.193 This argument
paralleled an argument that the Solicitor had made in an arti-
cle just prior to the case, in which he: (1) cited Maucorps as au-
thority for the proposition that subject matter expressed in
means-plus-function apparatus form may be indistinguishable
from method claims; and (2) cited In re Walter'94 as "[t]he test
for determining whether 'means for' apparatus claims should be
treated as method claims." 95 The cited passage from Walter
read, in pertinent part:
If the functionally-defined disclosed means and their equivalents
are so broad that they encompass any and every means for per-
forming the recited functions, the apparatus claim is an attempt
to exalt form over substance since the claim is really to the
method or series of functions itself.196
equations wherein one number is computed from a set of numbers. Thus, appel-
lant's claims wholly preempt the recited algorithms." Id. (citing Benson, 409 U.S.
at 71-72).
187. Maucorps, 609 F.2d at 485.
188. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
189. See infra notes 190-238 and accompanying text.
190. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
191. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
192. Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1371-72.
193. Id. at 1375.
194. 618 F.2d. 758 (C.C.PA. 1980).
195. McKelvey, supra note 2, at 8.
196. Walter, 618 F.2d at 768.
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The Federal Circuit in Iwahashi replied by stating that the
claims were subject to construction in accordance with 35
U.S.C. § 112.197
We point out that the claim is a combination of means all but one
of which is a means-plus function limitation, the one exception
being the ROM, clause [d], which is a specific piece of apparatus.
The claim is therefore subject to the limitation stated in 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 6.198
The court refused to hold that the means-plus-function claim
encompassed each and every means for performing the recited
functions and, consequently, refused to treat the claim as indis-
tinguishable from method claims.199 The court addressed its
seeming contradiction with the passage in In re Sweet,200 in
which the C.C.P.A. stated that means-plus-function claims are
interpreted broadly to cover every means capable of performing
the recited function and is not limited to the structures in the
specification.201 The Federal Circuit stated that the passage in
Sweet was, considered en vacuo, only partly true and that it
must be considered in the context of the previous two
paragraphs, where, the Federal Circuit asserted, the C.C.P.A.
had in fact construed the means in the claims to cover structure
in the specification and their equivalents. 202 The court con-
cluded that, the claim as a whole having asserted apparatus
and not a method, the invention was patentable subject matter
under § 101.203
Within four months of the Iwahashi decision, the PTO is-
sued a notice, authored by Acting Assistant Commissioner
James E. Denny, declaring that the PTO's "policy on the patent-
ability of claims reciting matematical [sic] algorithms and com-
puter programs . . . is unaffected by In re Iwahashi."204 The
197. Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1375.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1370 (interpreting In re Sweet, 393 F.2d 837 (C.C.P.A. 1968)).
201. Sweet, 393 F.2d at 841-42. The C.C.PA. stated in Sweet that "a recita-
tion of 'means' for performing a function is interpreted broadly to cover all means
capable of performing the stated function and is not limited to the particular struc-
ture which the application may disclose." Id.
202. Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1375.
203. Id.
204. James E. Denny, Notice Interpreting In Re Iwahashi, 1134 OFF. GAZ.




Acting Assistant Commissioner stated that the statutory sub-
ject matter in Iwahashi had resided in the single ROM element
of the claim, and not in the "apparatus" recited by the means-
plus-function language. 20 5
Later that year, in In re Bond,206 the Federal Circuit re-
versed and remanded another PTO means-plus-function claim
rejection, the claim in this case reciting a telephone answering
device remote turn-on mode.2°7 The B.P.A.I. had based its rejec-
tion of the first claim on § 102208 anticipation,2°9 which requires
an element-by-element comparison of the claimed invention to
the prior art,210 and based its rejection of the second claim on
§ 103211 obviousness. 212 Observing that the B.P.A.I. had not
suggested that the specification and prior art structures were
structurally equivalent, the court declared the § 102 rejection in
error.213 The court further said that the presence of a microcom-
puter structure in the specification overcame the obviousness
rejection.214 The court remanded the case and instructed the
PTO to interpret the "means-plus-function" claims with refer-
ence to the structures in the specification and their
equivalents. 215
In a notice to the Official Gazette, published in January,
1992,216 then-PTO Commissioner Harry F. Manbeck stated that
the PTO's position was that, despite Bond,217 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 6218 does not apply to patentability determinations
by the PT0 219 and, therefore, the PTO need not consider the
equivalents of structures in the specification when construing
205. Id. at 474.
206. 910 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
207. Id. at 832.
208. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
209. Bond, 910 F.2d at 832.
210. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
211. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
212. Bond, 910 F.2d at 834.
213. Id. at 832-33.
214. Id. at 834-35.
215. Id. at 835.
216. Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Notice for the Official Gazette: Applicability of the
Last Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to Patentability Determinations Before the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, 1134 OFF. GAz. PAT. OFFicE 631 (1992).
217. Id. at 633.
218. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
219. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 631.
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"means-for" claims.220 The PTO's primary authority for this
proposition was In re Lundberg,221 in which the C.C.P.A. af-
firmed a PTO rejection by the B.P.A.I. of claims directed to an
apparatus and method for performing geophysical exploration
by airplane.222 The commissioner relied in part on the Lund-
berg court's statement that, even under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para-
graph 6, "[1]imitations in the specification not included in the
claim may not be relied upon to impart patentability to an
otherwise unpatentable claim."223 The commissioner also con-
sidered Congress' subsequent reenactment, in light of Lund-
berg, of paragraph 6 as tacit agreement with the interpretation
that paragraph 6 does not apply to patentability determinations
by the PTO.224
In the subsequent infringement action, Arrhythmia Re-
search Technology v Corazonix Corp.,225 the Federal Circuit re-
versed a district court's failure to find statutory subject matter
in a method claim and an apparatus claim.226 Both claims re-
220. Id. at 633.
221. 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A 1957).
222. Id. at 552.
223. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 634 (citing Lundberg, 244 F.2d at 548). The
Commissioner pointed out two Federal Circuit decisions that declared past
C.C.PRA decisions binding on the Federal Circuit and insusceptible to overruling
by the Federal Circuit except when sitting en banc. Id. (citing Capital Elec. v.
United States, 729 F.2d 743, 746 (Fed. Cir. 1984); South Corp. v. United States,
690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982)). See also supra note 115.
224. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 631. The commissioner also relied on: (1)
the PTO's history of disregarding paragraph 6 in patentability determinations, id.
at 632; (2) his opinion that the words "cover" and "construe" implicated court, not
agency, action or interpretation when 35 U.S.C. § 112 was enacted in 1952, id. at
633-34; and, inter alia, (3) policy considerations such as PTO workload and the
difficulty of making equivalency determinations without expert testimony, id. at
635.
225. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
226. Id. at 1053. Claim 1 is the broadest method claim:
1. A method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the pres-
ence or absence of a predetermined level of high frequency energy in the late
QRS signal, comprising the steps of:
converting a series of QRS signals to time segments, each segment hav-
ing a digital value equivalent to the analog value of said signals at said
time;
applying a portion of said time segments in reverse time order to high
pass filter means;
determining an arithmetic value of the amplitude of the output of said
filter; and
comparing said value with said predetermined level.
37
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quired the use of mathematical manipulations to arrive at the
result.227 Although the district court held that the invention
was a mathematical algorithm, the Federal Circuit declared
that, as a whole, the first claim was a process for detecting the
risk of a heart attack and the second was an apparatus for the
same.228 The Federal Circuit applied the Freeman229-Walter230-
Abele231 test to the process claim,23 2 with the result that the
claim was upheld as patentable by analogy to "those upheld in
Diehr, wherein the Court remarked that the applicants 'do not
seek to patent a mathematical formula .... [Tihey seek only to
foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction
with all of the other steps in their claimed process.' "233 In con-
sidering the apparatus claim, the court explicitly followed the
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 4 mandate to interpret each claim
by reference to the specification. 23 5 As a result, the court found
the "means... described in the specification as a specific elec-
tronic device, a conventional analog-to-digital converter."23 6 Ac-
cordingly, the invention was deemed an "apparatus of practical
Id. at 1055. Claim 7 is a representative apparatus claim:
7. Apparatus for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the
level of high frequency energy in the late QRS signal comprising:
means for converting X, Y, and Z lead electrocardiographic input signals
to digital valued time segments;
means for examining said X, Y, and Z digital valued time segments and
selecting therefrom the QRS waveform portions thereof;
means for signal averaging a multiplicity of said selected QRS
waveforms for each of said X, Y, and Z inputs and providing composite, digi-
tal X, Y, and Z QRS waveforms;
high pass filter means;
means for applying to said fiter means, in reverse time order, the ante-
rior portion of each said digital X, Y, and Z waveform; and
means for comparing the output of said filter means with a predeter-
mined level to obtain an indication of the presence of a high frequency, low
level, energy component in the fiter output of said anterior portions.
Id.
227. Id. at 1058-60.
228. Id. at 1066.
229. In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
230. In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
231. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
232. Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1058-59.
233. Id. at 1059 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 209 (1980)).
234. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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utility and specified application,"237 which was subject to protec-
tion under the patent laws.2
F. In re Donaldson: 239 Requiring the PTO to Follow 35
U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph 6.
In the Federal Circuit's en banc February 1994 decision, In
re Donaldson,24° the court conclusively settled that the PTO
must construe means-plus-function claims to cover structures
in the specification and their equivalents. 241 In Donaldson, the
applicant had sought to patent a self-cleaning air filter assem-
bly that contained an interior wall which flexed in response to
pressure pulses.242 Such pressure pulses had been commonly
used in the art to dislodge dust from filters; the flexure in the
interior walls helped the dislodged dust to migrate downward
into the assembly's bottom hopper.243 The applicant had de-
scribed the wall as "means, responsive to pressure increases in
said chamber caused by said [pressure pulsation] cleaning
means, for moving particulate matter in a downward direc-
tion."244 The PTO examiner rejected the application and the
B.P.A.I. affirmed because, in the B.P.A.I.'s view, a prior patent
237. Id. at 1061.
238. Id.
239. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also R. Carl Moy, Means Expressions
in the USPTO: the Effect of In re Donaldson, 63 PATENT WORLD 31 (1994). Mr. Moy
was Counsel of Record to the Donaldson Company in the case under discussion.
Id. at 35.
240. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Although the Federal Reporter does not
designate the decision as en banc, all of the judges on the Federal Circuit at the
time participated in the decision. Id. at 1189.
241. Id. at 1193.
242. Id. at 1191.
243. Id.
244. Id. The entire claim on appeal read:
An air filter assembly for filtering air laden with particulate matter, said
assembly comprising:
a housing having a clean air chamber and a filtering chamber, said
housing having an upper wall, a closed bottom, and a plurality of side walls
depending from said upper wall;
a clean air outlet from said clean air chamber in one of said side walls;
a dirty air inlet to said filtering chamber positioned in a wall of said
housing in a location generally above said clean air outlet;
means separating said clean air chamber from said filtering chamber
including means mounting a plurality of spaced-apart filter elements within
said filtering chamber, with each of said elements being in fluid communica-
tion with said air outlet;
825
39
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:787
had already disclosed a "means" for moving the dust
downward. 245
The Federal Circuit reversed, stating that the B.P.A.I. had
improperly failed to construe the means recited in the claims to
cover the structure disclosed in the specification, as required by
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6.246 The court declared that para-
graph 6 must be applied regardless of context, and the court
expressly overruled Federal Circuit and C.C.P.A. precedent, in-
cluding In re Lundberg, to the extent that such precedent held
otherwise.247 The court then applied the paragraph 6 mandate
and came to the "inescapable conclusion" that the applicant had
adequately defined the means by providing specific characteris-
tics and embodiments in the specification. 24 Next, the court
compared the specification-defined means with the patent cited
in the Board's obviousness rejection and found that the cited
patent neither taught nor suggested the flexible wall claimed by
the applicant. 249 Accordingly, the court concluded that the cited
patent neither anticipated nor rendered obvious the applicant's
invention.20
pulse-jet cleaning means, intermediate said outlet and said filter ele-
ments, for cleaning each of said fiter elements; and
a lowermost portion in said filtering chamber arranged and constructed
for the collection of particulate matter, said portion having means, respon-
sive to pressure increases in said chamber caused by said cleaning means, for
moving particulate matter in a downward direction to a bottommost point in
said portion for subsequent transfer to a location exterior to said assembly.
Id.
245. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1191. The court noted that, although the PTO
commissioner relied on § 103 obviousness, the commissioner's arguments sounded
more like § 102 anticipation. Id. at 1197.
246. Id. at 1192.
247. Id. at 1193-94.
248. Id. at 1196. The court pointed to the applicant's description of a "sloping
surface constructed of a material which flexes in response to the pressure differen-
tials created within the chamber during the operation of the pulse-jet cleaning
means." Id. at 1195. The court also pointed to other details, such as the appli-
cant's statement that the wall was "preferably made from a flexible, reinforced
rubber sheet material." Id. at 1196.
249. Id. at 1196. The court explicitly noted that the PTO commissioner had
failed to show that the interior walls disclosed in the cited patent inherently vi-
brated in response to pressure pulsations and thereby accomplished the same re-
sult. Id. at 1197. Furthermore, the court rejected the notion that such vibrations
would have constituted an equivalent to the flexible, diaphragm-like walls de-
scribed by the applicant. Id.
250. Id. at 1197.
826
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In arriving at its conclusion that the PTO was bound by the
terms of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, the court cited the "plain
and unambiguous meaning of paragraph six"251 and the absence
of any PTO exemption in the statute's language or legislative
history.252 The court rejected the argument that Congress knew
of, and acquiesced to, a contrary PTO interpretation when twice
reenacting paragraph 6.253 Furthermore, the court rejected def-
erence to longstanding PTO practice, stating: "The fact that the
PTO may have failed to adhere to a statutory mandate over an
extended period of time does not justify its continuing to do
so."254
The court explained that paragraph 6 did not alter the prin-
ciple of according claims their broadest reasonable interpreta-
tion.25 5 Rather, paragraph 6 merely limited "how broadly the
PTO may construe means-plus-function language under the ru-
bric of 'reasonable interpretation.' "256 The court asserted that
such claim construction did not conflict with the principle that
limitations from the specifications may not be incorporated into
the claims. 257
The Commissioner confuses impermissibly imputing limitations
from the specification into a claim with properly referring to the
specification to determine the meaning of a particular word or
phrase recited in a claim. What we are dealing with in this case is
the construction of a limitation already in the claim in the form of
a means- plus-function clause and a statutory mandate on how
that clause must be construed.258
On May 17, 1994, the PTO published its response in the
Official Gazette, stating that "effective immediately, examiners
shall interpret a § 112, 6th paragraph 'means or step plus func-
tion' limitation in a claim as limited to the corresponding struc-
251. Id. at 1193.
252. Id.




257. Id. at 1195.
258. Id. (citations omitted). The court stated that its holding did not conflict
with the 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2 mandate to particularly point out and dis-
tinctly claim the subject matter of the invention. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112). The
applicant must still comply with paragraph 2 by indicating in the specification
what is meant by the "means" recited in the claims. Id.
827
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ture, materials or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof in accordance with the following guide-
lines."259 The subsequent guidelines stated that the examiner
carries an initial burden of proving that the claimed invention
is the same as, or equivalent to, a functionally identical prior
art structure. 260 However, the guidelines also stated that the
burden of proving non-equivalence shifts back to the applicant
if the prior art structure "is not excluded by any explicit defini-
tion provided in the specification for an equivalent."26' The
guidelines also emphasized that, even if the applicant meets its
burden and thereby overcomes a § 102 anticipation rejection,
the examiner could still find the invention obvious under § 103
by also considering elements from other prior art structures. 262
The guidelines also: (1) identified three ways of proving
non-equivalence to avoid a § 102 anticipation rejection;263 (2)
emphasized that the scope of equivalents would depend on the
breadth of the corresponding description in the specification;264
and (3) listed several inquiries helpful for making equivalency
259. Means or Step Plus Function Limitation Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6th Par-
agraph, 1162 OFF. GAz. PAT. OFFICE 59, 59 (1994) [hereinafter PTO Guidelines for
§ 1121.
260. Id. According to the guidelines, the invention is anticipated under § 102
if a prior art structure performs the claimed function and is structurally
equivalent to the applicant's invention. Id. at 59-60.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 60. According to the guidelines, at least three "reasons" might be
advanced to show non-equivalence:
Such reasons may include, but are not limited to:
1) teachings in the specification that particular prior art is not equivalent,
2) teachings in the prior art reference itself that may tend to show non-
equivalence, or
3) Rule 132 affidavit evidence of facts tending to show non-equivalence.
Id.
264. Id. at 60.
If the disclosure is so broad as to encompass any and all structure, material
or acts for performing the claimed function, the claims must be read accord-
ingly .... On the other end of the spectrum, the "equivalents" limitation as
applied to a claim may also operate to constrict the claim scope to the point
of covering virtually only the disclosed embodiments. This can happen in
circumstances where the specification describes the invention only in the
context of a specific structure, material or act that is used to perform the
function specified in the claim.
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/3
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determinations.265 Finally, the PTO encouraged a restrictive
view of means-plus-function claims by suggesting more strin-
gent application of other patentability requirements. 266 Noting
that the Donaldson decision might cause "some uncertainty as
to what applicant regards as the invention,"267 the guidelines
suggested that means-plus-function claims might be rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph
2, 35 U.S.C. § 102, or 35 U.S.C. § 103, if "not supported by corre-
sponding structure, material or acts in the specification
disclosure."268
G. In re Alappat:269 Applying Donaldson to Computer
Inventions
The Federal Circuit issued another opinion addressing the
role of means-plus-function claims several months after issuing
the Donaldson decision.270 The court had considered the cases
so closely related that it had combined the oral arguments from
both cases into one hearing.271 However, the second case, In re
Alappat,272 contained several issues which complicated its
disposition.
265. Most of the PTO's inquiries derived directly from the Supreme Court's
test in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). See
supra note 131 and accompanying text (describing the doctrine of equivalents and
providing the Graver Tank test). However, R. Carl Moy notes that one of the in-
quiries appears more similar to the Japanese test for equivalency. Means Expres-
sions in the USPTO, supra note 239, at 34, 35 n.21. That inquiry was "[wihether a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the interchangeability of
the element shown in the prior art for the corresponding element disclosed in the
specification." PTO Guidelines for § 112, supra note 259, at 60.
266. PTO Guidelines for § 112, supra note 259, at 61.
267. Id.
268. Id. See also supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text (summarizing 35
U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 patentability requirements).
269. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
270. The Donaldson opinion issued February 14, 1994. In re Donaldson, 16
F.3d 1189, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Alappat decision issued July 29, 1994. Alap-
pat, 33 F.3d at 1526.
271. En Banc Federal Circuit Hears Arguments on Board Independence and
Section 112 f 6, 45 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1122, at 412 (March
18, 1993) [hereinafter Federal Circuit Hears Arguments]. The Federal Circuit
heard the appeal en banc. Id. Briefs by appellant and amicus curi were accepted.
Id. at 412-13.
272. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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In Alappat, a patent applicant contested an examiner's re-
jection of means-plus-function claims directed to a "raster-
izer-a mathematical algorithm-based invention for displaying
smooth waveform data.273 A three member B.P.A.I. panel re-
versed the examiner after applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele
two-part test.274 Under the first step of the test, the three mem-
ber panel concluded that the claims recited a mathematical al-
gorithm. 275 Accordingly, the panel applied the second step of
the test, inquiring whether the claims recited merely the math-
ematical algorithm or whether they also recited statutory sub-
ject matter.276 In analyzing the claims, the panel emphasized
the means-plus-function claim format.277 "The distinguishing
feature of the claims on appeal.., is that they set forth struc-
ture utilizing a 'means for' performing a specified function claim
approach permitted by 35 U.S.C. 112, paragraph six."278 The
panel found that the means recited in the claims corresponded
to structure in a figure provided in the specification 279 and could
not be described so broadly as to encompass every means for
performing the specified function.2s° Because the claims
thereby recited apparatus, the panel concluded that the inven-
tion was statutory subject matter. 2 '
The PTO Commissioner responded by ordering a rehearing
after reconstituting the panel with five additional members of
his own choosing. 282 Because claims 15-19 were stated to stand
or fall together, the expanded panel considered only claim 15:m
273. Examiner's Action, U.S Pat. Application, Ser. No. 07/149,792, 2 (P.T.O.
1988); Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1537-39.
274. Ex parte Alappat, Appeal No. 91-1277 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f. June 26,
1991), in Joint Appendix for Appellants Kuriappan P. Alappat, Edward E. Averill
and James G. Larsen, In re Alappat, 33 F.2d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
275. Id. at 241-42.




280. Id. at 247.
281. Id. at 248.
282. Reply to Examiner's Request for Reconsideration, U.S. Pat. Application,
Ser. No. 07/149,792 (P.T.O. 1991); Federal Circuit Hears Arguments, supra note
271, at 412.
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15. A rasterizer for converting vectors in a data list representing
sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel
illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means
comprising:
(a) means for determining a vertical distance between the
endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining an elevation of a row of pixels that
is spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation;
and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a pre-
determined function of the normalized vertical distance and
elevation. 2
The expanded panel, which had adjudicated the matter prior to
Donaldson, cited Walter and Maucorps for the rejection of form,
i.e., "means-plus-function" form, 2 8 over § 101 subject matter
substance.m The expanded panel declared that it was not
bound to presume that a means-plus-function claim is directed
to a specific apparatus in the specification. 287 Instead, the panel
reasoned that § 112, paragraph 2m requires that any claimed
apparatus must be determinable from the claim.289 Applying
this rationale to claim 15, the expanded panel found that the
claims cited no specific apparatus, but instead read on any and
every means for performing the recited function.290 Due to the
lack of structural limitations, the panel found the claim indis-
tinguishable from a method claim, which, in turn, failed as be-
ing directed to a nonstatutory method or algorithm. 291
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the en banc court identi-
fied two main issues.292 The first issue was whether the PTO
284. Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
285. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
286. Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341-42 (citing In re Walter,
618 F.2d. 758 (C.C.P.A- 1980); In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.PA. 1979)).
287. Id. at 1343.
288. Paragraph 2 directs applicants to provide "claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming" what the applicant regards as the subject matter of
the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2.
289. Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
290. Id. at 1345. A claim "reads on" a reference when every element in the
claim may be found in the reference. 1 IRvINo R. KAYTON, PATENT PRACTICE 2-13
to 2-14 (4th ed. 1989).
291. Ex parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345-46.
292. Federal Circuit Hears Arguments, supra note 271, at 412-13.
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commissioner acted within the scope of his authority in recon-
stituting the panel and whether the court could reach the mer-
its of such an improperly constituted panel's decision. 293 The
second issue inquired whether Alappat's claims were directed to
35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter in view of 35 U.S.C. § 112.294
While the appeal was pending, the court issued the Donaldson
opinion.295 Four months later, on July 29, 1994, the court is-
sued the Alappat decision.296 A majority of the court297 con-
cluded that the court possessed jurisdiction to reach the merits,
although two of the judges refrained from ruling on the commis-
sioner's conduct in reconstituting the panel.298 On the merits, a
different majority declared that the expanded panel erroneously
failed to apply 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 when construing
Alappat's means-plus-function claims;299 as a result, the ex-
panded panel erred in declaring that Alappat's claims were un-
patentable as directed to nonstatutory subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101.300
The majority's discussion of the merits began with a review
of Alappat's application and the PTO proceedings.301 The ma-
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1189. The Federal Circuit issued Donaldson on
February 14, 1994. Id.
296. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1526.
297. Seven separate opinions were written by the judges in Alappat, repre-
senting divergent views on the PTO commissioner's actions and on the merits of
the case. Judge Rich wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Judges New-
man, Lourie, and Rader on the issue of jurisdiction, and by Judges Newman, Lou-
rie, Michel, Plager, and Rader on the merits. Id. at 1530-45. Judges Archer and
Nies dissented on the merits. Id. at 1545-68 (Archer, C.J. and Nies, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Newman wrote a separate opinion, concur-
ring on the merits. Id. at 1568-71 (Newman, J., concurring). Judges Meyer &
Michel dissented on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1571-77 (Meyer and
Michel, JJ., dissenting). Judge Plager wrote a separate opinion concurring on the
issue of jurisdiction. Id. at 1577-81 (Plager, J., concurring). Judge Rader wrote a
separate opinion, concurring on the merits. Id. at 1581-83 (Rader, J., concurring).
Judges Schall and Cleverger dissented on the issue of jurisdiction. Id. at 1583-85
(Schall & Cleverger, JJ., dissenting). They expressed no view on the merits. Id.
298. Chief Judge Archer and Circuit Judge Nies declined to rule on the com-
missioner's conduct. Id. at 1545-51. The other concurring judges agreed that the
commissioner validly exercised his authority in reconstituting the panel. Id. at
1530-45, 1568-71, 1577-83.
299. Id. at 1540.
300. Id. at 1544-45.
301. Id. at 1536-40.
832
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jority continued by noting without comment that the expanded
panel had dismissed the Federal Circuit's statements in In re
Iwahashi3° 2 as dicta and had dismissed Arrhythmia Research
Technology v. Corazonix Corp.30 3 as inapplicable to PTO pro-
ceedings. 30 4 The majority then cited the recent Donaldson deci-
sion as conclusively binding authority that the PTO is not
exempt from 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6.305 The panel "there-
fore erred as a matter of law in refusing to apply § 112 6 in
rendering its § 101 patentable subject matter determination."306
After dismissing the Commissioner's reliance on cases such as
Walter and Maucorps as either inapplicable in view of Donald-
son or distinguishable on other grounds, °7 the majority demon-
strated its claim interpretation under paragraph 6 by literally
incorporating elements from Alappat's specification into Alap-
pat's claims.30 8 The majority's formulation of claim 15 was as
follows:
A rasterizer [a "machine"] for converting vector list data repre-
senting sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-
aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a dis-
play means comprising:
(a) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an abso-
lute value function, or an equivalent thereof] for determining the
vertical distance between the endpoints of each of the vectors in
the data list;
(b) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an abso-
lute value function, or an equivalent thereof] for determining the
elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned by the vector;
302. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See also supra notes 190-205 and accom-
panying text (discussing Iwahashi and the PTO response).
303. 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also supra notes 225-38 and accom-
panying text (discussing Arrhythmia).
304. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1539. The panel had stated that Arrhythmia was
inapplicable because it was an infringement action, not an ex parte PTO proceed-
ing. Id.
305. Id. at 1540 (citing Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 1540-41. For example, the majority distinguished the claims in
Walter as having lacked supporting structure in the specification and dismissed
Maucorps in view of Donaldson. Id. Furthermore, the majority asserted that the
claims in Maucorps had been directed to a business methodology, which was non-
patentable subject matter. Id.





(c) [a pair of barrel shifters, or equivalents thereof] for nor-
malizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) [a read only memory (ROM) containing illumination in-
tensity data, or an equivalent thereof] for outputting illumination
intensity data as a predetermined function of the normalized ver-
tical distance and elevation. 3°9
According to the majority, this reformulation illustrated the
statutory subject matter contained in Alappat's "means-plus-
function" claims.310
The majority responded to the expanded panel's argument
that Alappat's invention fell within the "mathematical al-
gorithm" exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101, as enunciated in Gott-
schalk v. Benson,3 11 Parker v. Flook,312 and Diamond v. Diehr.313
The majority opined that the "Supreme Court never intended to
create an overly broad, fourth category of subject matter ex-
cluded from § 101."3 14 Rather, the Supreme Court only meant
that mathematical subject matter is, until reduced to practical
application, no more than a collection of abstract ideas.315 Ac-
cording to the majority, the appropriate inquiry is whether the
invention "as a whole" is directed to statutory subject matter or
whether it is instead directed to an abstract mathematical con-
cept.316 If directed to an abstract mathematical concept, the in-
vention "represents nothing more than a 'law of nature,'
'natural phenomenon,' or 'abstract idea,'"317 which would be
precluded by Diehr.318 The majority determined that Alappat's
invention as a whole was not directed to an abstract mathemat-
ical concept, but instead was directed to statutory subject mat-
ter because it combined interrelated elements into a rasterizer
machine, which converts waveform data into antialiased pixel
309. Id. The claims, including the bracketed expressions, are reproduced as
provided in the court's opinion. Id.
310. Id. at 1541-45.
311. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). See also supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
312. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See also supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
313. 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1542-43. See also supra notes
67-72 and accompanying text.
314. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1543-44.
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illumination data for displaying on a display means. 19 The ma-
jority stated that "[tihis is not a disembodied mathematical con-
cept which may be characterized as an 'abstract idea,' but
rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tan-
gible result."320
Although the majority acknowledged that Alappat's inven-
tion transformed data, arguably through mathematical equa-
tions, the majority asserted that Alappat's claim 15 was not so
broadly drawn as to wholly preempt all apparatus employing
such equations.321 The majority stated that claim 15 instead
comprised "a particularly claimed combination of elements"
which collectively formed a patentable machine.322 Acknowl-
edging Alappat's admission that properly programmed general
purpose computers could conform to claim 15, the majority re-
jected the expanded panel's argument that such an admission
precluded patentability. 323 "We have held that such program-
.ing creates a new machine, because a general purpose com-
puter in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to in-
structions from program software."324 The majority criticized
the expanded panel's contrary view as improperly dismissing all
programmed general purpose computers from the realm of stat-
utory subject matter.325 Citing Benson, the majority stated that
"a computer operating pursuant to software may represent pat-
entable subject matter, provided, of course, that the claimed
subject matter meets all of the other requirements of Title
35."32 Having determined that Alappat's invention met those
requirements, the majority declared Alappat's invention patent-






323. Id. at 1545.
324. Id.
325. Id.
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III. Analysis
A. Congressional Silence and the Supreme Court's Reluctance
to Address Software Patentability
Insight into the Federal Circuit's views on software patent-
ability and into its decision in In re Alappat328 may be gained by
considering Congress' failure to enact sui generis legislation, de-
spite prompting by the Supreme Court and some commentators,
led by Pamela Samuelson.32 Samuelson had supported her po-
sition by calling for a close look at the Court's language in Gott-
schalk v. Benson,330 Parker v. Flook,3 31 and Diamond v. Diehr 32
to discern the Court's intent and goals. 33 Those goals were
328. 33 F.3d 1526 (1994).
329. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; Samuelson, supra note 4,
at 1132 n.426, 1148-53. See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Con-
cerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUm. L. REv. 2308 (1994)
(arguing that, compared to other intellectual property, computer programs are dis-
tinguished by their capacity to exhibit behavioral characteristics, and advocating
sui generis legislation to protect against "cloning" and to require contributions for
reimplementing protected software); Alan D. Minsk, The Patentability of Algo-
rithms: A Review and Critical Analysis of the Current Doctrine, 8 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 251 (1992) (urging an alternative protection scheme
to current software patentability doctrine); John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or
Both: An Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software Protection, 5 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 145 (1991) (advocating a modified version of copyright protection); Randall
M. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Plea for Due Processes: Defining the Proper Scope of
Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103 (1991) (urging
Congress to modify the current mathematical algorithm software patentability
doctrine). For extensive criticism of these views and of Samuelson's arguments in
particular, see Paul Heckel, The Software-Patent Controversy, COMPUTER LAW.,
Dec. 1992, at 13; John M. Griem, Jr., Note, Against a Sui Generis System of Intel-
lectual Property for Computer Software, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145 (1993).
330. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
331. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
332. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
333. Samuelson argued that courts should reject patents for computer pro-
grams unless and until Congress enacts sui generis legislation. See Samuelson,
supra note 4, at 1148. Samuelson found "substantial basis in patent law for Ben-
son's ruling that computer program algorithms are unpatentable and for rejection
of patents for many other program-related innovations." Id. at 1030.
[Tihe issue has a more legislative tone, as though the patentability of com-
puter programs and algorithms is an open issue about which it would be
appropriate to ask if patents are "good" or "bad" for the industry and for
society. Predictions that patents may be harmful to the software industry,
computer science, mathematics, or society as a whole have been quite fre-
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stated most prominently in Benson, where the Court, refraining
from granting patent protection to a computerized method for
converting BCD to binary numerals, cited a presidential com-
mission report documenting the lack of PTO search facilities for
computer programs and the absence of a classification tech-
nique.33 The Court stated that considerable problems would be
associated with holding such programs patentable, and that
such problems could be managed only by congressional
committees.335
If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are
raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad
powers of investigation are needed, including hearings which can-
vass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field
entertain. The technological problems tendered in the many
briefs before us indicate to us that considered action by the Con-
gress is needed.336
These points were emphasized by antagonists of granting pat-
ent protection in the absence of sui generis legislation.337 How-
ever, the Court based its ultimate holding on the well-settled
Id. at 1133. Although Samuelson has recently recognized that the judicial system
may have developed sufficient legal doctrine to allow the software industry to sur-
vive the law's inadequacies, she still advocates a sui generis system of software
protection. Samuelson, et al., supra note 329, at 2420-21. "While doing nothing is
not the option we recommend, it is worth noting that existing law does provide
meaningful protection to some commercially valuable aspects of programs." Id.
334. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT
SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 13).
335. Id. at 73 (citing, inter alia, Robert W. Wild, Computer Program Protec-
tion: The Need to Legislate a Solution, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 586, 604-09 (1969)).
See also The Case Against Patent Protection, supra note 4, at 1133.
336. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73.
337. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1058 n.114. However, at least one
commentator has taken the position that the PTO now possesses sufficient search
capabilities and that, as a result, Benson should be narrowly construed. Kenneth
C. Brooks, Human Ingenuity: A Novel Standard for Patenting Algorithms, 22
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 455, 478 (1992).
The Commission's concern that patenting would become mere registra-
tion is understandable considering the 1793 Act was such a system and
proved unworkable .... However, the problems raised by the Commission
are no longer present today.
The Patent Trademark Office recently completed an automated patent
search system as a part of an automation effort begun in 1980. They have
taken steps to facilitate searching for prior art by reclassifying subclasses of
computer-related technology so that people with computer related back-
grounds can explore prior art more proficiently. Because the problems that
51
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rule against patenting ideas,3 s rather than on a broad proscrip-
tion against computer program patents. The Court thereby
demonstrated its reluctance to suggest that computer programs
were undeserving of patent protection. Indeed, proponents of
judicially extending patent protection to software emphasized a
passage in Benson that seemed to express that the Court might
advocate software patents in proper circumstances: 339
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particu-
lar machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or
materials to a "different state or thing." We do not hold that no
process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the require-
ments of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision pre-
cludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not
so hold. °
By issuing a narrow holding and admonishing Congress to act,
the Court avoided super-legislating the computer program pat-
entability issue at an early stage of software jurisprudence.
The Court may have hoped that the lower courts would follow
its lead in avoiding the software issue, but lower courts are
were present when the Court rendered its Benson decision are no longer
present, the Court should limit Benson to the facts of that case.
Id. (citations omitted).
338. In the following passage, the Court limited its holding by basing its con-
clusion on the narrow judicial exception that proscribes patenting an "idea."
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that
would be the result if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure bi-
nary numerals were patented in this case. The mathematical formula in-
volved here has no substantial practical application except in connection
with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is af-
firmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
339. See, e.g., Chisum, supra note 4, at 988, 1010-19 (arguing that case law
has appropriately imposed a burden of proving the excludability of algorithms
from patentable subject matter and that Congress should not legislate against al-
gorithm patentability); Irah H. Donner and J. Randall Beckers, Throwing Out
Baby Benson with the Bath Water: Proposing a New Test for Determining Statutory
Subject Matter, 33 JuRIMETRIcs J. 247, 248 (1993); Lance L. Vietzke, Note,
Software Patent Protection: A Problem-Solution Theory for Harmonizing the Prece-
dent, 12 COMpuTER/L.J. 25, 30 (1993); Jerome T. Tao, Comment, Theories of Com-
puter Program Patentability, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 291,
297, 297 n.30 (1991).
340. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
838
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much more frequently faced with intellectual property litigation
and must ultimately address the issues with judicial candor.
The problems identified by the Supreme Court in Benson
may have indeed been more suited to congressional committees
with the support of experts in the technology.341 Such legisla-
tion is not entirely without precedent. The Patent Act of 1836342
is an example of legislation where the concerns were similar to
the Court's concern that extending patent protection to software
would be tantamount to mere registration. 343 In that case, Con-
gress enacted much more sweeping changes to patent law, form-
341. Benson, 409 U.S. at 73. See also Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1105.
Even if policy reasons were to favor the patenting of program algorithms, it
may be more appropriate for such a decision to be made by Congress than by
an appellate court or an administrative agency like the Patent Office be-
cause the patenting of computer program algorithms represents a signifi-
cant departure from patent tradition.
Id.
342. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (amended 1870).
343. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72. The Supreme Court in Benson echoed the Presi-
dential Commission's concern that allowing software patenting would be tanta-
mount to mere registration. Id.
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because of
a lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files. Even if
these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or economic
because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without
this search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to mere regis-
tration and the presumption of validity would be all but nonexistent.
Id. (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 13).
The Patent Act of 1836 was enacted because patenting under the previous patent
act was also tantamount to mere registration. Under the 1793 Act, "patents were
granted almost automatically, and ... the patent business of the State Depart-
ment was handled almost entirely by a clerk of the Department." Kendall J. Dood,
Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880, 65 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'y 187, 201
(1983); FLOYD L. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND Eco-
NOMIC CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 19 (1970). Congress enumerated
the following shortcomings of the patent system that existed prior to the Patent
Act of 1836:
1. A considerable portion of all the patents are worthless and void, as con-
flicting with, and infringing upon one another, or upon, public rights not
subject to patent privileges; arising either from a want of due attention to
the specifications of claim, or from the ignorance of the patentees of the
state of the arts and manufactures, and of the inventions made in other
countries, and even in our own.
2. The country becomes flooded with patent monopolies....
3. Out of this interference and collision of patents and privileges, a great
number of lawsuits arise, which are daily increasing in an alarming degree,
onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and injurious to society.
53
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ing the foundation upon which the patent system is based
today. 344 Furthermore, Congress has recently set a precedent
for enacting computer-related sui generis legislation in the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 3 4 5 which protects
mask works of read only memory (ROM) chips.346
In addition to the prior art searching concerns cited by the
Court in Benson,347 congressional committees would have been
better able to elicit the assistance of the computer industry.
The Committees could then set the scope of protection, more ra-
tionally establishing clearer lines between a sufficiently com-
plex, inventive and, therefore, patentable combination of
computer-implemented steps and those that fall under the long
established proscription against patenting "mental steps."34
Congress might have also determined whether patent protec-
tion should cover "source" code, "object" code, flowcharts, or
some combination of each.349 Similarly, Congress would have
been better suited to set the appropriate disclosure require-
ments, and to decide whether applicants should disclose the
"source" code, "object" code, flowcharts, or some combination of
4. It opens the door to frauds .... [I]t is not uncommon for persons to copy
patented machines... and having made some slight immaterial alterations,
they apply in the next room for patents ....
Senate Committee Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess.
(April 28, 1836), reprinted in DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS 6 app., at 12-4 (1985).
See also supra note 337.
344. See generally Dood, supra note 343, at 234. Among the changes to patent
law were the incorporation of the novelty and utility requirements. See Vaughan,
supra note 343, at 19.
345. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
346. Id. Congress is also considering sui generis legislation in the similarly
new and expanding area of biotechnology innovation. See H.R. 5664, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990). See also Isabelle McAndrews, Removing the Burden of Durden
Through Legislation: H.R. 3957 and H.R. 5664, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'y 1188 (1990); Louis S. Sorell & Susan Y. Lehnhardt, Current State of Law
Regarding Biotechnology Process Patents V-1 (April 16, 1991) (unpublished mate-
rial from the Seventh Annual Joint Patent Seminar, Philadelphia Patent Law
Ass'n, on file with author).
347. See supra notes 335-36 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 20, 45-55 and accompanying text. See also Theories of
Computer Program Patentability, supra note 339, at 307. "The Mental Steps doc-
trine is particularly important in the context of computer program patentability.
At some level, all programs are 'mental steps' in that they represent a logical pro-
cess." Id.
349. See Tao, supra note 339, at 312-15.
840
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each.350 Are computer programs "processes?" If so, Congress
could have determined whether all products made by an in-
fringing process could be foreclosed from entering the coun-
try.351 All of these questions might have been addressed by
Congress, but Congress remained silent.
Although Flook and Diehr affirmed the Court's approach in
Benson, their narrow language was no more helpful to the lower
courts in daily decision-making. The Supreme Court in Flook
extensively cited Benson352 and expanded on the policy argu-
ments that drove the Court to issue a narrow, but negative
holding in Benson. In Flook, the Court cited the PTO acting
commissioner's fear that, if not reversed, the C.C.P.A. decision
upholding patentability would have "a debilitating effect on the
... computer 'software' industry" and would result in a flood of
additional patent applications. 353 The Court agreed to hear the
case because of the "importance of the question."354 However,
the Court again issued a narrow proscription against patenting
mathematical algorithms 3 55 to avoid super-legislating on the
larger question of computer program patentability. Although
the Court conceded that certain computer programs would cer-
tainly advance the objectives of the patent system, the Court
emphasized that software patentability involved complex issues
more appropriately addressed by Congress.356
Neither the dearth of precedent, nor this decision, should there-
fore be interpreted as reflecting a judgment that patent protection
of certain novel and useful computer programs will not promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, or that such protection
350. Id. See also Michael Bondi, Comment, Upholding the Disclosure Re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 Through the Submission of Flow Charts with Com-
puter Software Patent Applications, 5 SoFrwARE L.J. 635, 639 (1992) (analyzing
the "controversy over submission of flow charts versus source code to fulfill the
disclosure requirement").
351. A similar controversy has arisen in the context of obtaining protection
against importing biotechnology products created from infringing starting materi-
als. See supra note 346.
352. Flook, 437 U.S. at 585-87, 589-91, 593.
353. Id. at 587-88.
354. Id. at 588.
355. Id. at 594. "Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101, not be-
cause it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once
that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as
a whole, contains no patentable invention." Id.




is undesirable as a matter of policy. Difficult questions of policy
concerning the kinds of programs that may be appropriate for pat-
ent protection and the form and duration of such protection can be
answered by Congress on the basis of current empirical data not
equally available to this tribunal.357
Although common law had developed in the past to fill gaps of
congressional silence, the gap in this instance was so wide, and
growing with every technological innovation, that the Court ap-
parently felt it beyond the capacity of the properly cautious ju-
diciary to keep pace. The Court stated, "[iut is our duty to
construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light of our
prior precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we are
asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by
Congress."358 Although the Court reversed the C.C.P.A.'s find-
ing of patentable subject matter, the Court narrowly based its
holding on the "mathematical algorithm" exception. 359
In Diehr, the Court extensively cited its prior decisions360
and rendered another narrow decision which avoided either
sanctioning or discouraging computer program patents.361
However, by that time, nine years had passed since the Court
had asked Congress to enact sui generis legislation in Benson.
It was under these circumstances that the Diehr Court implied
that software aspects might be treated as mathematical algo-
rithms-programs would neither impart patentability nor de-
357. Id. at 595. Just as it had done in Benson, the Court noted that the
threshold merits and demerits of software patentability were still being debated
and that those who favored software patentability could not even agree on whether
the patent term should be 17 years. Id. at 595 n.19.
358. Id. at 596. The Court cited Mr. Justice Byron White for support in re-
quiring Congressional response:
We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving
the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beach-
head of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts
had previously thought. No such signal legitimizes respondent's position in
this litigation.
Id. (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1971)).
359. Id.
360. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 179-80, 184-89, 191 (citing Benson); Id. at 185-87,
189, 191-92 (citing Fook).
361. Id. at 192-93. "Because we do not view respondents' claims as an at-
tempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather to be drawn to an industrial
process for the molding of rubber products, we affirm the judgment of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals." Id.
842 [Vol. 15:787
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feat patentability. The Court began its decision by recognizing
that the patent had been rejected for the computer-control as-
pect of the invention.3 2 "[The examiner] determined that those
steps ... that are carried out by a computer under control of a
stored program constituted nonstatutory subject matter under
this Court's decision in [Benson]."s63 Although the Court lim-
ited its rationale to mathematical equations,364 the Court im-
plied an extension to computer programs.365 "Our earlier
opinions lend support to our present conclusion that a claim
drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula,
computer program, or digital computer."3W The Court also im-
plicated computer programs by highlighting the distinction that
the applicant's claims were "not limited to the isolated step of
'programming a digital computer,'-367 but, rather, asserted a
physical rubber curing process, which rendered the claims pat-
entable subject matter.36 This holding, in which the Court ar-
guably imposed a requirement of some physical transformation
for software-related processes, provided little guidance regard-
.ng computer programs in which no physical transformation oc-
curred.369 Finally, the Court may have said most by saying
362. Id. at 179-80.
363. Id. at 179-80.
364. Id. at 192.
[Wlhen a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies
that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the
claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.
Id.
365. Id. at 187.
366. Id. The Court made this statement just after separately considering the
role of the computer. Id. "Obviously, one does not need a 'computer' to cure natu-
ral or synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process patent
significantly lessens the possibility of'overcuring' or 'undercuring,' the process as a
whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject matter." Id.
367. Id. at 193 n.15.
368. Id. at 187-88, 193 n.15.
369. See also Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1101-02 (arguing that Diehr pro-
vides only weak support for the patentability of computer algorithms in general,
and the Karmarkar algorithm in particular).
[I] one remembers that Diehr was a five-to-four decision, that more dissent-
ers than members of the majority are still on the Court, that the Court in
Diehr repeatedly emphasized that Diehr's process was traditionally indus-
57
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least-the Court cited none of the policy arguments made in
Benson and Flook against patenting computer programs, leav-
ing the lower courts to infer that these arguments were no
longer very persuasive.
The Court's reluctance to explicitly rule on computer pro-
gram patentability in Benson, Flook, and Diehr was no endorse-
ment of judicially extending broad patent protection to
software. However, after nine years of legislative silence in the
face of rapid software industry growth, the Court was under-
standably hesitant to argue against limited judicial expansion.
Although the Court's implied suggestion that software should
neither impart nor defeat patentability was consistent with the
structure of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the Federal Circuit
has not applied this test to non-algorithm software claims.
B. The Problem with Applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele
Analytical Test to Software Inventions
Through In re Freeman,370 In re Walter, 71 and In re
Abele,3 72 the C.C.P.A. developed a consistent, coherent approach
to determining whether a claim asserts a mathematical al-
gorithm.373 "First, it must be determined whether the claim di-
rectly or indirectly recites an 'algorithm' in the Benson sense of
that term." 74 If it is determined that the claim does not assert
an algorithm, then the inquiry is at an end. If the claim does
assert an algorithm, then the second part of the test is whether
the claim would assert patentable subject matter absent the al-
gorithm.37 5 If the claim would assert patentable subject matter
absent the algorithm, then the claim, as a whole, asserts pat-
entable subject matter when the algorithm is included. 376 "[11f
trial in nature and transformed matter, and that the Court cited Benson and
Flook approvingly throughout the Diehr opinion, it is clear that Diehr pro-
vides a fragile base for supporting the patentability of the Karmarkar al-
gorithm. Unless and until Benson is overruled, patents on algorithms such
as Karmarkar's are suspect.
Id. at 1102. See also id. at 1131-32.
370. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
371. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980),
372. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
373. See supra part 1.C.
374. Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245.
375. See supra part II.C.
376. See supra part II.C.
844 [Vol. 15:787
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the claim would be 'otherwise statutory,' . . . albeit inoperative
or less useful without the algorithm, the claim likewise presents
statutory subject matter when the algorithm is included."377
The distinction between patentable and unpatentable
claims in In re Abele378 illustrates the proper mathematical al-
gorithm analysis, as applied to process claims. In that case, the
applicant's claims 5 and 6 were:
5. A method of displaying data in a field comprising the steps of
calculating the difference between the local value of the data at a
data point in the field and the average value of the data in a re-
gion of the field which surrounds said point for each point in said
field, and displaying the value of said difference as a signed gray
scale at a point in a picture which corresponds to said data point.
6. The method of claim 5 wherein said data is X-ray attenuation
data produced in a two dimensional field by a computed tomogra-
phy scanner.379
The court concluded that claim 5 was "directed solely to the
mathematical algorithm."380 Accordingly, claim 5 "satisfied"
both steps of the test in that, under the first step, the claim re-
cited an algorithm and, under the second step, it was not ap-
plied in any manner to physical elements. 38 ' Consequently, the
court declared claim 5 nonstatutory subject matter under
§ 101. 382 By virtue of dependence on claim 5, claim 6 also re-
cited a mathematical algorithm.383 Therefore, step one was sat-
isfied. However, the court found that claim 6 required x-ray
attenuation data, which is only available through the use of a
computerized axial tomography (CAT) scanner.384 Referring to
the physical CAT scanner element, claim 6 would be "'other-
wise statutory,'. . . albeit inoperative or less useful without the
377. Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
378. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
379. Abele, 684 F.2d at 908.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 908-09.
382. Id. at 909; 35 U.S.C. § 101.





algorithm."385 Therefore, the court declared that claim 6 recited
statutory subject matter under part two of the test.M6
As Abele demonstrated, the patentable subject matter anal-
ysis of mathematical algorithm claims is straightforward. This
analysis could have been readily extended to computer program
claims by modifying the test slightly. Step one would have in-
quired whether the claim was directed to a mathematical al-
gorithm or computer program. If the claim recited neither a
mathematical algorithm nor computer program, then the in-
quiry would be at an end, just as it would end under the mathe-
matical algorithm test. If the claim did recite either a
mathematical algorithm or computer program, then the inquiry
would be whether the claim would be otherwise statutory, albeit
inoperative, absent the algorithm or program. This modified
Freeman-Walter-Abele test would have had the advantage of the
mathematical algorithm test's precedent and analytical struc-
ture. Also, by encompassing both software and algorithms, the
modified test would have diminished the arbitrary line drawing
and addressed the concern that all software is ultimately math-
ematics and that the distinction between mathematical and
nonmathematical algorithms has an extremely fragile basis. 387
Finally, the modified test would have adopted the Supreme
Court's implied suggestion that computer programs neither im-
part nor defeat patentability.
The Federal Circuit has not yet extended the Freeman-Wal-
ter-Abele mathematical algorithm test to computer programs.
385. Id. at 907 (citing In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
The method of claim 6, unlike that of claim 5, requires "X-ray attenuation
data." The specification indicates that such attenuation data is available
only when an X-ray beam is produced by a CAT scanner, passed through an
object, and detected upon its exit .... Were we to view the claim absent the
algorithm, the production, detection and display steps would still be present
and would result in a conventional CAT-scan process.
Id. at 908.
386. Id. at 908-09.
387. See, Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, The Models Are
Broken, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1023, 1024 (1986) (responding to Donald S. Chisum,
The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PiT. L. REV. 959 (1986) (arguing for rever-
sal of Benson)). "[Ay attempt to find a helpful or cutting distinction between
mathematics and nonmathematics.. . is doomed." Id. Professor Newell is an au-
thor of several books on computer software. Samuelson, supra note 4, at 1031
n.15. For further discussion of the difficulties identified by Newell, see Samuelson,
supra note 4, at 1123-25.
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In considering software patentability, perhaps the Federal Cir-
cuit is trying to separate and thereby escape some of the juris-
prudence arising from mathematical algorithm analysis,
especially the so-called physicality requirement. In Benson,
Flook, and Diehr, the Supreme Court had required mathemati-
cal algorithm-containing processes to cause some physical
transformation, explaining that a process is statutory only if it
"either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or... [oper-
ates] to change articles or materials to a 'different state or
thing.'- 38 8 In Abele, the C.C.P.A. emphasized that this require-
ment was part of the Freeman-Walter-Abele mathematical al-
gorithm test by stating that "Walter should be read as requiring
... that the algorithm be 'applied in any manner to physical
elements or process steps.'"89 Thus, an extension of the Free-
man-Walter-Abele analytical test to software might impose sub-
stantive physicality requirements that had previously been only
applied explicitly to mathematical algorithms. For example,
the Freeman-Walter-Abele includes a physicality requirement.
The courts would have to delineate those software applications
that would satisfy this requirement. Furthermore, the courts
would have to determine the proper effect of claim drafting. For
example, under a Freeman-Walter-Abele analysis, a software
claim might fail if drafted as a process claim, due to the absence
of a physical transformation, whereas a software machine claim
might succeed by virtue of the presence of a general purpose
computer as structure in the specification, satisfying the subject
matter requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
C. Why Software "Machine" Claims May Be More Patentable
Than Software "Process" Claims
The distinction between a machine or apparatus claim and
a process or method claim is important because true machines
and apparatus are, without exception, patentable subject mat-
ter under § 101.390 "Once it is determined that the claim is
388. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. Although the Court disclaimed the rigid view
that "no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our
prior precedents," id., prior precedent is controlling until the Court or Congress
establishes an exception.
389. Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.




truley [sic] drawn to specific apparatus, it necessarily follows
that the apparatus is statutory subject matter under § 101."391
In contrast, some processes or methods have been judicially ex-
cluded from patentable subject matter.392 Gottschalk v. Benson
and its progeny have suggested that, when claims are drawn to
a method or process, some patentable physical transformation
must take place, as opposed to mere data transformation. In
Benson,3 93 where the Court scrutinized claims for a method of
converting BCD to binary numerals, the Court cited the defini-
tion given in Cochrane v. Deener:394
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state
or thing .... The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform
the process may or may not be new or patentable; ... The process
requires that certain things should be done with certain sub-
stances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing
this may be of secondary consequence.395
A process was thereby defined by the transformation of materi-
als or substances. 396 In Benson, the conversion of BCD data into
binary data was merely a data transformation, which could not
save the claims from a subject matter rejection that the claims
asserted merely an "idea."397
The Benson Court highlighted the distinction between the
"process" and "machine" patentability inquiries by stating that
391. Denny, supra note 204, at 474-75. "Apparatus" is equivalent to
"machine," which is specifically patentable subject matter under § 101. 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
392. Examples are the "mental steps," "method of doing business," and "math-
ematical algorithm" exceptions. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
393. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
394. Id. at 64 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877)).
395. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). The Court cited this defini-
tion again in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978), and again in Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981). The Court in Flook stated that, "[als in Benson,
we assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet one of
these qualifications of our earlier precedents." Flook, 437 U.S. at 588 n.9. How-
ever, the Court gave no indication of a process that would qualify for patent protec-
tion without qualifying under this definition. Accordingly, the definition is
controlling until the Court carves out an exception.
396. "[Alcts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced
to a different state or thing." Cochrane, 94 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added).
397. Id. at 71; see also supra note 388 and accompanying text.
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the "[t]ransformation . . . is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines."398
The Court further highlighted the distinction by reviewing sev-
eral process claim cases, demonstrating that the disposition of
the process claims were based on the quality of the transforma-
tions, including chemical, mechanical, and biological transfor-
mations. 99 Similarly, the claims in Parker v. Flook4°° and
Diamond v. Diehr401 were also drawn to processes or methods,
rather than machines. 4 2 As a result, the patentable subject
matter inquiry turned on the transformations. In Flook, the
process transformed data (process conditions data into alarm
limit data), just like the process in Benson (B.C.D. data into bi-
nary data), and data transformation again failed to save the
claims from a patentable subject matter rejection. 4° 3 In Diehr,
even though part of the invention was data transformation (pro-
cess conditions data into rubber cure time data),4° an integral
part of the invention was the physical transformation of un-
cured physical material or chemical compounds into cured rub-
ber.4° 5 It was this physical transformation that the Court found
dispositive in rendering the process or method claims
patentable. 4°6
In none of the three Supreme Court cases was the Court
faced with interpreting machine claims and, consequently, the
Court has not demonstrated whether machine or apparatus
claims should be treated differently from process or method
claims. If inventions which transform only data but are imple-
398. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
399. Id. at 70-71. The Court left room for fact specific exceptions. Id. at 71.
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular
machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a
'different state or thing.' We do not hold that no process patent could ever
qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents.
Id. When such a process or method claim that did not meet the prior precedent
requirements could ever qualify for patentability, the Court did not say. Instead,
the Court limited its inquiry to the specific process claims in question, which were
unpatentable as drawn to an "idea." Id. at 71-72.
400. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
401. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
402. See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
403. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
404. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 178-79.
405. Id. at 184. See also supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.




mented by general purpose computers do not, as methods, sat-
isfy patentable subject matter requirements, one might argue
that drafting such inventions as machine claims should not
make them patentable. However, confidence in this assertion
might be undermined if the applicant used means-plus-function
terms,'40 7 particularly in view of the Federal Circuit's decision In
re Alappat,408 in which the Federal Circuit held that a software
means-plus-function machine claim satisfied the subject matter
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 409 The impact of according
claim language substantive effect is enlarged by the Federal
Circuit's recent In re Donaldson410 decision, which now requires
the PTO also to apply 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 when con-
struing means-plus-function claims. Due to the effect of this de-
cision on software claims, the propriety of the Donaldson
decision must be examined.
D. The Effect of Means-Plus-Function Claims on Computer
Program and Mathematical Algorithm Patentability
The 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6411 mandate to construe
means-plus-function claims to cover structures in the specifica-
tion and their equivalents has bred confusion and controversy,
particularly with regard to computer program and mathemati-
cal algorithm inventions.412 If this claim format is accorded
substantive effect, a software or mathematical algorithm "pro-
cess" claim, phrased as a "computer means for" accomplishing
the software or algorithm's function, becomes a "machine"
claim, so long as the specification recites a computer. As a re-
sult, the claim would be automatically deemed patentable sub-
ject matter under § 101. 4 13
407. Cf Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1247 ("Though a claim expressed in 'means for'
(functional) terms is said to be an apparatus claim, the subject matter as a whole
of that claim may be indistinguishable from that of a method claim drawn to the
steps performed by the 'means.' "); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67-68 (citing Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)) (comparing the patentable subject
matter scrutiny of a "product" claim to the scrutiny of a process claim, stating, "we
think the same principle applies").
408. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
409. See supra part II.G.
410. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
411. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
412. See supra part II.E.
413. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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Relying on its position that § 112, paragraph 6 did not ap-
ply to the PTO,414 the PTO argued that means-plus-function
claims capable of being read so broadly as to encompass every
means capable of performing the recited function were really
method claims, not machine claims.415 To avoid the Federal
Circuit's contrary position that the claim interpreter must con-
strue the "means" to cover structure in the specification for sub-
stantive purposes,41 6 the PTO argued that § 112, paragraph 6
did not apply to the PTO.4 17 By declining to follow the Federal
Circuit's interpretation and in refusing to construe claims to
cover the structures and equivalents listed in specifications, the
PTO became the most salient and potent antagonist of the Fed-
eral Circuit's interpretation. Due to these conflicting views,
patent attorneys were subjected to substantial uncertainty re-
garding software patentability and the effect of means-plus-
function claims. In In re Donaldson4l8 and In re Alappat,4 9 the
Federal Circuit correctly resolved its basic conflict with the
PTO, but some confusion still remains.
1. In re Donaldson:420 The Federal Circuit's Cursory But
Correct Conclusion that the PTO Must Construe
Means-Plus-Function Claims to Cover
Structures in the Specification and
Their Equivalents
To the extent that PTO policy conflicts with the patent stat-
ute, the statute must prevail. In In re Donaldson,42' the court
pointed out that § 112, paragraph 6422 appears to be clear on its
face-means-plus-function claims must be construed to cover
structures in the specification and their equivalents. 423 The
Federal Circuit adequately refuted Commissioner Manbeck's
414. See supra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
415. Federal Circuit Hears Arguments, supra note 271, at 412; Ex parte Alap-
pat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340, 1344 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f 1992).
416. See In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
417. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 631.
418. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
419. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
420. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
421. Id.
422. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (1988).




emphasis on the value of longstanding PTO precedent. 424 How-
ever, Commissioner Manbeck had also argued that: (1) in 1952,
when 35 U.S.C. § 112 was enacted, the usage of terms in para-
graph 6 corresponded to infringement actions before the courts,
not ex parte proceedings before the PTO;425 (2) if applied to the
PTO, 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 would effectively narrow the
scope of some claims to corresponding structures in the specifi-
cation, which, in turn, would conflict with the long-standing
principle that claims are given their broadest possible interpre-
tation in patentability determinations by the PTO;426 and (3)
early C.C.P.A jurisprudence holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112, para-
graph 6 does not apply to patentability determinations should
be accorded substantial weight, particularly because 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, paragraph 6 was subsequently reenacted without change
in the wake of this precedent. 4 7 These arguments were either
ignored or summarily dismissed by the court. Nevertheless, the
court was correct in its final conclusions, as indicated by a more
in-depth analysis of Commissioner Manbeck's arguments.
a. The Language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph 6
In his notice to the Official Gazette, Commissioner Man-
beck supported his argument against applying 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 6 to the PTO by citing the commentary that P.J. Fe-
derico had made shortly after the enactment of paragraph 6:428
[Paragraph 6] relates primarily to the construction of such claims
for the purpose of determining when the claim is infringed (note
the use of the word "cover"), and would not appear to have much,
if any, applicability in determining the patentability of such
424. Id. at 1194. See Manbeck, supra note 216, at 635 (emphasizing the im-
portance of PTO precedent regarding means-plus-function claims when such pre-
cedent has withstood judicial interpretation and in light of which Congress was
silent). See also supra note 254 and accompanying text (describing the court's re-
sponse that longstanding failure to comply with the statute does not justify contin-
uing noncompliance).
425. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 631, 633-34.
426. Id. at 635-36. Commissioner Manbeck points out that the stringent
"broadest reasonable interpretation" rule is justified because patents that are ulti-
mately issued enjoy a presumption of validity by the courts in infringement ac-
tions. Id. at 635.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 631 (citing Federico, supra note 133, at 25-26). Commissioner
Manbeck notes that Mr. Federico assisted in drafting the Act. Id.
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claims over the prior art, that is, the Patent Office is not author-
ized to allow a claim which "reads on" the prior art.429
Commissioner Manbeck's reliance on Mr. Federico's statement
was misplaced because Mr. Federico was an employee of the
Patent Office and, although working with the House Subcom-
mittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, was not a leg-
islator, nor did he speak for any portion of Congress.430 The
Federal Circuit recognized this in Donaldson,431 where the court
asserted that Federico was "merely stating his personal
views"432 when he wrote the statement and that such state-
ments did not constitute legislative history. 433 Furthermore,
Mr. Federico's statement was equivocal. 434
Mr. Federico also incorrectly implied that the use of the
term, "cover," corresponded only to infringement actions, rather
than ex parte patentability proceedings before the Patent Office.
Contrary to Mr. Federico's implication, the term "cover" had
been frequently used in the patentability context contempora-
neous with and prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of
1952. 435 Mr. Federico also mistakenly implied that the term
429. Id.
430. Moy, supra note 107, at 275-76. "The mistaken authority given to Mr.
Federico's commentary seems to stem from a confusion between his status as a
textual author of the '52 Act's provisions, and the legislator's status as legal au-
thors voting on it." Id. at 276.
431. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193 n.3.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Mr. Federico used equivocal phrases such as "relates primarily" and
"would not appear to have much" applicability. See also Moy, supra note 107, at
278-79.
435. See, e.g., In re Cox, 198 F.2d 846, 847 (C.C.PA. 1952) ("The instant
claims cover the use (of) not only those solvents illustrated by way of examples but
also of others which might be found operative as a result of further experiment.");
In re Ray, 198 F.2d 831, 834 (C.C.P.A. 1952) ("It will be observed that the Board
was of opinion that ... as the appealed claims were sufficiently broad to cover
every possible means of accomplishing the desired purpose, they were broader
than appellants' invention.") (quoting In re Lawson, 83 F.2d 1001, 1002 (C.C.P.A.
1936)); In re Coey, 190 F.2d 347, 348 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("Claim 17 is directed to the
method sought to be patented, and claim 18 covers a machine embodying that
method."); In re Coleman, 189 F.2d 976, 980 (C.C.PA. 1951) ("While the patented
claims cover methods of protecting certain specified foodstuffs.... the appealed
claims cover a specific wrapper capable of use in protecting any type of foodstuffs
.... "); In re Heltzer, 189 F.2d 971, 975 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("Claim 12 recites broadly
'a false-bodying agent,' thus seeking to cover all false-bodying agents whatever
their composition."); In re Muskat, 187 F.2d 626, 628 ("[Alppellants have estab-
67
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was used in §§ 102 and 103 of Title 35,436 relating to novelty and
nonobviousness. 43 7 Therefore, "cover" was consistent with pat-
entability determinations. Commissioner Manbeck raised the
related argument that the term, "construed," also implicated an
infringement action.438 However, the term, "construed," was
commonly used in the patentability context immediately prior
to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952;439 its use refutes Mr.
Manbeck's assertion that the word implicates infringement, and
instead shows that the 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 language is
consistent with patentability determinations.
Commissioner Manbeck also argued that the reference in
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 to the doctrine of equivalents,
lished that the here allowed species claims, 9 and 10, cover subject matter ...
which is patentably distinct from the species covered by their patents. .. ."); In re
Porter, 184 F.2d 198, 200 (C.C.P.A. 1950) ("In our opinion, appellants were allowed
claims broad enough to cover every patentable element which they saw fit to dis-
close and claim in their application."); In re Frey, 182 F.2d 184, 186 (C.C.P.A.
1950) ("The solicitor in his belief concedes that appellant had been asserting claims
in his parent patent which cover the subject matter of the Finley patent claims, in
that the subject matter of the copied claims are covered .. .
436. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
437. Moy, supra note 107, at 275 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103).
438. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 633-34.
439. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 193 F.2d 335, 337 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("[Tlhe shield 58
of Fig. 12, described in claim 28 as a 'cup-shaped part with an integral base,' must
be construed to be a tube' within the ordinary meaning of that term."); In re Tama-
rin, 187 F.2d 160, 163 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("Claim 35 fairly construed specifies such a
device."); In re Kinney, 168 F.2d 756, 757 (C.C.P.A. 1948) ("We are of opinion that
the expression 'mutually reciprocating,' as it must be construed in the light of ap-
pellants' application, requires a regular movement of the compressor elements rel-
atively to each other, and that it should not be so broadly construed as to cover two
elements which are reciprocated at different rates of speed."); In re Hatch, 167 F.2d
1003, 1004 (C.C.P.A. 1948) ("Under such circumstances, it was proper for the ex-
aminer and the board to construe the appealed claims in the light of the disclosure
of the Greider et al. patent."); In re Waldie, 164 F.2d 375, 376 (C.C.P.A. 1947) ("The
board held that 'dehydrated castor oil' should be given its usual and ordinary
meaning and that, when this term is so construed, the claims read upon the prior
art as applied by the examiner."); In re Haskell, 157 F.2d 206, 207-08 (C.C.P.A.
1946) ("The issues here are whether or not appellant's original application, which
had in it claims 1, 2, 3, and 7, later canceled by appellant, was deliberately con-
fined to an artificial drive, and whether those claims can be construed to include a
natural drive as alleged by appellant, and if so whether their cancellation was a
deliberate abandonment of the subject matter of the involved claims."); In re
Thompson, 154 F.2d 189, 192 (C.C.PA. 1946) ("[T]he Patent Office did not reject
the involved claims for the reason that claim 1 might be construed, as pointed out
in the brief of the Solicitor, as a Markush claim .. ").
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makes sense only in infringement actions."0 However, C.C.P.A.
precedent prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph
6 again refutes Commissioner Manbeck's assertion. 441 The lan-
guage of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 is entirely consistent
with Congressional intent that paragraph 6 apply to patentabil-
ity determinations by the PTO.
b. Structures from the Specification Constitute
Elements, Not Limitations
Commissioner Manbeck's argument that 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 6 conflicts with the principle that claims should be
given their broadest reasonable interpretation in patentability
determinations before the PT0442 is also flawed. As indicated
by the court in Donaldson, the commissioner's argument was
based on an erroneous assumption that applying paragraph 6 to
the PTO would require the PTO to import limitations into the
claim, conflicting with the principle of according claims their
broadest reasonable construction.443 The court provided cursory
and inadequate treatment to this argument, but arrived at the
correct conclusion. The language of 35 U.S.C. § 112 refers to
construing "elements," not "importing limitations."4" Constru-
ing elements to cover structures in the specification does not vi-
olate the principle that claims are to be given their broadest
interpretation.
Although often overlooked or confused, patent law has gen-
erally drawn a distinction between an element and a limita-
tion.445 In the context of specifically considering the impact of
35 U.S.C. § 112 means-plus-function claims, the Federal Circuit
440. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 634.
441. See, e.g., In re Dalton, 183 F.2d 75, 76 (C.C.P.A. 1950) ("The doctrine of
equivalents is applied when the words of a claim presented for allowance by an
applicant for a patent describe an invention disclosed in a patent previously
granted.).
442. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 635-36.
443. Id. at 633-34. See also Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1195; see also supra notes
257-58 and accompanying text.
444. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
445. See Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528,
1533 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also Becker, supra note 108, at 253-54 (discussing




has distinguished between an element and a limitation of a
claim.4 6
References to "elements" can be misleading. "Elements" often is
used to refer to structural parts of the accused device or of a de-
vice embodying the invention. "Elements" is also used in the
phrase "[an element of a claim" in 35 U.S.C. § 112 6. An ele-
ment of an embodiment of the invention may be set forth in the
claim (e.g., "said connecting means" in clause (h) of the present
claim). It is the limitation of a claim that counts in determining
both validity and infringement, and a limitation may include de-
scriptive terms (e.g., "tapped into the coil at a point near, but
spaced from, the grounded end thereof" in clause (h)). Because
claims are composed of a number of limitations, the limitations
have on occasion been referred to as "claim elements" or "ele-
ments of the claim," but clarity is advanced when sufficient word-
ing is employed to indicate when "elements" is intended to mean a
component of an accused device or of an embodiment of an inven-
tion and when it is intended to mean a feature set forth in or as a
limitation in a claim." 7
The Federal Circuit's distinction between elements and limita-
tions is consistent with case law existing prior to the enactment
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, including C.C.P.A. review of
patentability determinations by the PTO.4 48
Congress was aware of the legal meaning of the word, "limi-
tations," in the context of 35 U.S.C. § 112. In the directly pre-
ceding paragraph, Congress twice used the word consistent
with the legal meaning accorded by the courts.
446. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1533 n.9.
447. Id.
448. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. Skinner, 197 F.2d 807, 810 (6th Cir. 1952)
("Where the claims of a patent define an element in terms of form, location, or
function, thereby creating an express limitation... other forms may not be treated
as equivalents."); Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 178 F.2d 794, 799 (7th Cir.
1949) ("[S]uch language is in words of limitation which express the relationship of
the structural elements only, and for this reason such claims are not to be consid-
ered as functional."); In re Hooker, 175 F.2d 558, 562 (C.C.P.A. 1949) ("Inasmuch
as the claim fails to state any cooperative relationship of the 'means for modulat-
ing target image light' with any other element of the claim, the board held that
element of the claim to be merely additive and not a patentable limitation."); In re
Benner, 174 F.2d 938, 941 (C.C.PA. 1949) ("Obviously it was the view of the tribu-
nals of the Patent Office that the introductory phrase, 'A ball mill lining element,'
with which each of the appealed claims begins, is not a limitation entering into the
structure of the composition of which the lining element is composed.").
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A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in
the alternative only, to more than one claim previously set forth
and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter
claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis for
any other multiple dependent claim. A multiple dependent claim
shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations
of the particular claim in relation to which it is being
considered. 449
In accordance with the canon of construction, inclusio unius est
exclusio alteriuss,450 one should construe Congress' choice not to
use "limitation" in paragraph 6 as evidence that Congress did
not envision paragraph 6 as importing limitations into claims.
In addition to this basic canon of construction, Congress is pre-
sumed to be aware of the judicial interpretations of a statute
and to have adopted such interpretations in the reenactment (or
enactment) of a statute.451 Because judicial interpretation drew
the distinction between element and limitation at the time 35
U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 was enacted (and subsequently reen-
acted), Congress is presumed to have been aware of the distinc-
tion and to have meant "element," not "limitation."
The distinction between elements and limitations is often
confusing, particularly with regard to process claims. For ex-
ample, a process may require the heating of some material at
high temperature. "High temperature" may be considered the
element, whereas specific temperature ranges, such as 300-
400°C, might be considered limitations. 452 The distinction with
regard to apparatus claims is often more manageable because
an apparatus element is usually a structural component or the
structure itself, whereas, by contrast, a limitation describes the
449. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
450. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius literally means: "The inclusion of one
is the exclusion of another." BLAcKi's LAW DIcTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1990). "This
doctrine decrees that where law expressly describes [a] particular situation to
which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted
or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded." Id.
451. See Manbeck, supra note 216, at 632 (citing Lorrilard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
474, 580 (1978); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1039 (Ct. Cl. 1977)).
452. See MERGES, supra note 23, at 676 (providing a similar example, but con-
trasting by example differing views regarding the distinction between elements
and limitations). See also In re Edwards, 285 F.2d 811, 812-13 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
(holding that temperatures listed in specification examples could not be imported




detailed physical attributes of those components. 4 3 Section
112, paragraph 6 impliedly focuses on apparatus claims because
it states that an element must be construed to cover "structure"
when means-plus-function claims are used.454
Under proper paragraph 6 analysis, elements in means-
plus-function claims, not limitations, are construed to cover
structure in the specification. Accordingly, if a claim recites a
means for sitting, and chairs are described in the specification,
then the "means" element should be construed to cover chairs.
However, the limitations suggested in the specification regard-
ing the size or strength of the chairs may not be imported be-
cause they are not elements of the chair or the chair itself-
they characterize the chair. Unless expressly limited within
the text of the claims, the claims would be broadly construed to
recite chairs of any size, any strength, and any texture. 455 In
contrast, to ignore the chair's structure would be to vacate an
element of the claim, which would be an "unreasonable" inter-
pretation. Therefore, as stated in Donaldson, the application of
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 to patentability determinations by
the PTO is consistent with giving claims their broadest reason-
able interpretation. 456 Although a grey area exists between
pure "element" and pure "limitation," such grey areas arise in
all conceptual line drawing, and the distinctions provided in
longstanding precedent provide guidelines for deciding each
case. 457 Although the Federal Circuit may be fairly criticized for
using the "element" and "limitation" terms loosely, even in its
Donaldson decision,'458 this failure does not alter its ultimately
correct conclusion.
453. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1533 n.9.
454. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
455. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 635.
456. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194-95.
457. E.g., Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
458. The court stated: "What we are dealing with in this case is the construc-
tion of a limitation already in the claim in the form of a means-plus-function clause
and a statutory mandate on how that clause must be construed." Donaldson, 16
F.3d at 1195. However, the court should have stated that it was dealing with the
construction of an element.
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c. C.C.P.A. Precedent as a Basis for Applying 35
U.S.C. § 112, Paragraph 6 to PTO
Patentability Determinations
Commissioner Manbeck also cited C.C.P.A. precedent as
binding authority that 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 does not
apply to PTO patentability determinations. Commissioner
Manbeck relied primarily on In re Lundberg,459 which stated:
[N]otwithstanding the [sixth] paragraph of section 112, it is the
language itself of the claims which must particularly point out
and distinctly claim the subject matter which the applicant re-
gards as his invention, without limitations imported from the
specification, whether such language is couched in terms of means
plus function or consists of a detailed recitation of the inventive
matter. Limitations in the specification not included in the claim
may not be relied upon to impart patentability to an otherwise
unpatentable claim.460
This passage is in no way inconsistent with requiring the PTO
to apply 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 in patentability determi-
nations. The cited passage states that "limitations in the speci-
fication shall not be relied on to impart patentability."461 This
statement is absolutely true-only the elements and limitations
in a claim may impart patentability. The court in Lundberg
recognized the distinction between elements and limitations, as
was evident from its discussion of a prior art reference. 462
"While the amendments... originally submitted ... were nu-
merous, there was adequate disclosure in the specification as
filed to meet each element as broadly recited . . . (as well as
several of the limitations presented by the other claims in this
appeal)."463 The court said nothing inconsistent with assigning
structure to elements, which, as demonstrated, is distinguished
from importing limitations.464 Furthermore, the court said
nothing to indicate that the PTO was exempt from 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, paragraph 6.465 Therefore, it was unnecessary for the
459. 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
460. Id. at 548.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 549.
463. Id.
464. See supra notes 442-58 and accompanying text.




Federal Circuit to summarily overrule Lundberg to the extent
that Lundberg diverged from the court's reasoning. 466
Commissioner Manbeck also relied heavily on In re
Sweet,467 where the court stated that "a recitation of 'means' for
performing a function is interpreted broadly to cover all means
capable of performing the stated function and is not limited to
the particular structure which the application may disclose."468
However, as the Federal Circuit stated in In re Iwahashi,469 the
court in Sweet did in fact construe the claims to cover structure
in the specification in the immediately preceding two
paragraphs of the opinion. 470 In addition, the Federal Circuit
pointed out that recited means are indeed not limited to a par-
ticular structure but, rather, include the permissible range of
equivalents, as expressly dictated by 35 U.S.C. § 112, para-
graph 6.4 71 However, the Federal Circuit failed to note that
"means" are not "limited" by the specification, but are structur-
ally identified in accordance with the element-limitation dis-
tinction.472 It is concededly difficult to explain the court's
statement in Sweet that "a recitation of 'means' for performing a
function is interpreted broadly to cover all means capable of
performing the stated function,"473 but in light of the court's cor-
rect application of the statute, the clear statutory language, and
a fair reconstruction of congressional intent, this statement, by
itself, should not dictate the inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Finally, Commissioner Manbeck correctly stated that
C.C.P.A. precedent is binding on the Federal Circuit, except
when the Federal Circuit sits en banc.4 7 4 However, later
C.C.P.A. decisions sub silentio overrule previous conflicts with
466. After stating its rationale that 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 applies to
the PTO, the court simply stated: "To the extent that In re Lundberg, In re Arbeit,
or any other precedent of this court suggests or holds to the contrary, it is ex-
pressly overruled.' Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193-94.
467. 393 F.2d 837 (C.C.PA. 1968).
468. Id. at 841-42.
469. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
470. Id. at 1375 (citing Sweet, 393 F.2d at 841-42).
471. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 112.
472. See supra notes 442-58 and accompanying text.
473. Sweet, 393 F.2d at 841-42.
474. Manbeck, supra note 216, at 634. See also South Corp. v. United States,
690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). See also supra note 115.
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C.C.P.A. precedents. 475 Any C.C.P.A. precedent prior to 1973
that might have suggested that 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6
does not apply to PTO patentability determinations was super-
seded by In re Knowlton.476 Because C.C.P.A. precedent prior to
Knowlton was consistent with the plain meaning of paragraph
6,477 and because C.C.P.A. precedent subsequent to Knowlton,
such as Hale Fire Pump Co. v. Tokai, Ltd.,478 was also consis-
tent with a plain reading of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, with-
out limitation to infringement actions,479 it can be fairly
concluded that C.C.P.A. precedent required that the PTO con-
strue means-plus-function claims to cover structures in the
specification and their equivalents in accordance with the plain
meaning of the 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6. Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit's ultimate conclusion in Donaldson was consis-
tent with prior case law and the court need not have summarily
brushed the prior case law aside.
475. In re Gostelti, 872 F.2d 1008, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See also supra note
115.
476. 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.PA. 1973). In regard to an application for a com-
puter-based invention for determining commonality and correlating a data list, the
C.C.P.A. scrutinized the specification to determine if disclosed means correspond-
ing to a means-plus-function claim satisfied the disclosure requirements of § 112,
paragraph 1. Id. The court concluded that, "[i]f the applicant chooses to use such
language, the statute instructs the interpreter of the claims, e.g., the Patent Office
or the courts, as to how such language shall be interpreted." Id. at 1366. See also
supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 459-73 and accompanying text.
478. 614 F.2d 1278 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
479. Id. at 1283 n.5. See also supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text. See
also In re Henatsch, 298 F.2d 954 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (patentability case between
Lundberg and Sweet where the C.C.P.A. construed means in the claims to cover
structure in the specification).
Construing the "means" specified in appellant's claim 19 to cover the embod-
iments described in his specification in connection with figures 24-27, on
which it reads, in which the "roof coverings may be made of canvas stretched
lightly over light frame structure," we find that Pollard also discloses a can-
opy or awning which provides an "overhead covering of rigid framework."




2. In re Alappat:480 Applying the Donaldson Decision to
Software Claims and Giving Substantive Effect to
Means-Plus-Function Claim Drafting
An analysis of In re Alappat481 suggests that the Federal
Circuit is experimenting with broader software patent protec-
tion by eroding the physicality requirement in two ways. First,
the court is giving substantive effect to means-plus-function
claim drafting; and second, the court is moving away from
mathematical algorithm jurisprudence, particularly the Free-
man-Walter-Abele test, to avoid the physicality requirement
that such jurisprudence invokes.
By according substantive effect to the means-plus-function
claims in Alappat, the Federal Circuit helped Alappat and sub-
sequent software inventors to effectively circumvent the physi-
cality requirement. The Federal Circuit began in Alappat with
the noncontroversial statement that the expanded B.P.A.I.
panel had erred by failing to construe Alappat's means-plus-
function claims to cover structures in the specification and their
equivalents.482 This result was required by Donaldson, which
had just resolved the PTO's responsibility under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, paragraph 6.483 To the extent that the Federal Circuit's
decision to reverse was based on the expanded panel's failure to
apply 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, the Alappat decision was a
small step in Federal Circuit jurisprudence. However, the Fed-
eral Circuit went beyond this precedent when it actually ap-
plied 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6.
In attempting to illustrate how 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph
6 should apply to Alappat's claims, the Federal Circuit grafted
phrases allegedly describing structure from the specification
onto corresponding means recited in Alappat's claims.484 The
result was a claim that no longer contained means expressions,
but instead described either a special purpose computer, con-
figured to perform rasterizer functions, or a general purpose
480. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
481. Id.
482. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540 (citing Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193). See also
supra notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
483. See supra part II.F.
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computer, programmed to do the same. For example, the
court's patchwork claim began:
A rasterizer [a "machine"] for converting vector list data repre-
senting sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-
aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a dis-
play means comprising:
(a) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an abso-
lute value function, or an equivalent thereof] for determining the
vertical distance between the endpoints of each of the vectors in
the data list.485
The court's description of the rasterizer as a machine assumed
the conclusion that the claim was, in fact, directed to a machine.
However, this conclusion was arguable at best.
Although the court correctly attempted to use structure
from the specification to define the means element in subsection
(a) of the claim,486 it is questionable whether the bracketed
phrases did actually represent true structure. An "an arithme-
tic logic circuit configured to perform an absolute value func-
tion, or an equivalent thereof"487 is created in any general
purpose computer merely by writing and compiling one or two
lines of code. Likewise, the circuits described by the bracketed
expressions in subsections (b) and (c) may also be created by one
or two lines of code in any general purpose computer.488 The
only bracketed phrase that arguably called for a discreet struc-
tural element was in subsection (d), which contained "a read
only memory (ROM) containing illumination intensity data, or
an equivalent thereof."489 However, the Federal Circuit stated
that this was not an operative distinction-the claims would
485. Id.
486. Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, the court was correct in construing
means elements in the claims as corresponding to structure in the specification-
in contrast to limitations, which must entirely reside in the claims themselves.
See supra part III.D.l.b.
487. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541.
488. Grafted subsections (b) and (c) were:
(b) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an absolute value func-
tion, or an equivalent thereof] for determining the elevation of a row of pix-
els that is spanned by the vector;
(c) [a pair of barrel shifters, or equivalents thereof] for normalizing the ver-






have described a rasterizer machine even without the ROM
element. 490
By grafting the bracketed expressions into the claims, the
court impliedly suggested that these expressions described
structure within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6.
However, to suggest that a few lines of computer code may be
considered "structure" stretches the meaning of structure be-
yond any physical boundaries. By so doing, the court advocated
an interpretation of means-plus-function claims that allows il-
lusory structure to give mock-physical substance to a "machine"
claim.491 The court further encouraged this legal fiction by stat-
ing: "We have held that such programming creates a new
machine, because a general purpose computer in effect becomes
a special purpose computer once it is programmed to perform
particular functions pursuant to instructions from program
software."492 Although this legal fiction did not straightfor-
490. In responding to the expanded panel's attempt to distinguish a prior case
on the basis that the claim in the prior case had recited a ROM element, the court
stated:
The Board majority's attempts to distinguish Iwahashi on the basis that the
claim at issue in that case recited a ROM are unavailing. The Iwahashi
court clearly did not find patentable subject matter merely because a ROM
was recited in the claim at issue; rather the court held that the claim as
whole, directed to the combination of the claimed means elements, including
the claimed ROM as one element, was directed to statutory subject matter.
It was not the ROM alone that carried the day.
Id. at 1544 n.24 (citing In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
491. Without this illusory structure, the applicant would be forced to claim
the invention as a method or process, which may be unpatentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, particularly if the Freeman-Walter-Abele requirement of
"application in [some] manner to physical elements or steps," In re Walter, 618
F.2d 758, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1980), were applied. See also supra part HI.C (explaining
the importance of distinguishing process from machine claims in the patentable
subject matter inquiry).
492. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545. See also Lee E. Barrett, PTO Perspective on
Recent Developments in Patent Protection for Computer Hardware and Software,
16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 627, 655 (1994).
The PTO is in the process of drafting guidelines to follow Alappat. One re-
maining question is whether the court has created a rule that claims in
means-plus-function format are statutory subject matter. The court seemed
to leave open the possibility that under the appropriate circumstances...,
where there was "apparent lack of any supporting structure in the specifica-
tion corresponding to the claimed 'means' elements,' it might still be proper
to treat claims as 'in effect nothing more than process claims in the guise of
apparatus claims." . . . It may be that a purely software disclosure (e.g.,
program code and flowcharts), may be one circumstance where a means-
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wardly assault the physicality requirement, the Federal Circuit
did erode the requirement, leaving it nominally intact as an av-
enue of retreat, should the court's position on software patenta-
bility later be deemed untenable.
E. Eroding the Physicality Requirement by Minimizing
Mathematical Algorithm Analysis
The court further eroded the physicality requirement by
circumventing mathematical algorithm analysis, and particu-
larly the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,493 in the court's analysis of
Alappat's claims. In contrast to the three member B.P.A.I.
panel, which had expressly applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test,494 the Federal Circuit stated that the test may be merely
"helpful under some circumstances to more fully understand
the claimed subject matter. Nevertheless, even in those cases
wherein courts have applied a variant of the two-part analysis
. ., the ultimate issue always has been whether the claim as a
whole is drawn to statutory subject matter."495
In downplaying the role of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,
the court effectively minimized the emphasis placed on physical
steps in the patentability inquiry. 496 Instead, the court empha-
sized that, as a whole, the claims were directed to a machine.497
plus-function claim could be treated as a process claim, but even this is in
doubt given the court's reliance on statements that a computer program in
effect creates a new machine.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
493. See supra part II.C for an overview of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and
supra part III.B for an explanation of how that test implicates a physicality re-
quirement-at least for mathematical algorithm patentability.
494. Ex parte Alappat, Appeal No. 91-1277 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int'f. June 26,
1991).
495. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
496. For a discussion of how the Freeman-Walter-Abele test emphasizes the
importance of physical steps in the patentability inquiry, see supra part III.B.
497. The court stated:
Given the foregoing, the proper inquiry in dealing with the so called
mathematical subject matter exception to § 101 alleged herein is to see
whether the claimed subject matter as a whole is a disembodied mathemati-
cal concept, whether categorized as a mathematical formula, mathematical
equation, mathematical algorithm, or the like, which in essence represents
nothing more than a "law of nature," "natural phenomenon," or "abstract
idea." If so, Diehr precludes the patenting of that subject matter. That is
not the case here.
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However, this talismanic use of "invention as a whole" language
in conjunction with a machine-like description of the software's
functional characteristics did not transform the invention into a
new machine. Again, the court succeeded only in eroding the
substance of the physicality requirement without dismissing
the requirement altogether.
F. Practical Advice for the Practitioner
The Federal Circuit's willingness to engage in limited legal
fiction in order to find computer-related inventions patenta-
ble498 is both a boon and a curse to the software patent practi-
tioner. The positive aspect is that the legal fiction of attributing
physicality to software claims drafted in means-plus-function
format creates a relaxed standard for software patentability.
This, in turn, may allow software developers to obtain patent
protection where none was previously available. The negative
aspect is that means-plus-function format limits the scope of
the claims to only those structures that are described in the
specification, and a potentially narrow range of equivalents. 499 -
This limitation is the cost that means-plus-function format ex-
acts for providing the drafter with the opportunity to include
every envisioned embodiment of the invention in the specifica-
tion, without having to include those embodiments in the
claims.
Because the current relaxed standard is limited to claims
drafted in means-plus-function format, the patent practitioner
should always claim software inventions as machines or appa-
ratuses in means-plus-function format. Furthermore, each
"means" should be capable of being satisfied by computer hard-
ware. For example, the court in Alappat defined several of the
means in Alappat's ultimately patentable invention as "arith-
Although many, or arguably even all, of the means elements recited in
claim 15 represent circuitry elements that perform mathematical calcula-
tions, which is essentially true of all digital electrical circuits, the claimed
invention as a whole is directed to a combination of interrelated elements
which combine to form a machine for converting discrete waveform data
samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed
on a display means.
Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544 (emphasis added).
498. See supra parts IL.D and E.
499. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). See also supra parts II.D, M.E, III.D, and III.E.
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metic logic circuits,"500 implying that the means could be inter-
preted as electrical circuitry hardware. Of course, practitioners
should ensure that the means are also capable of being satisfied
by software programmed to accomplish the identified function.
Software means-plus-function claims should be divided into
several interrelated means because 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph
6 allows means-plus-function claims only for combinations.50
Segregation into several components has the added benefit of
facilitating the analogy to hardware circuit components, which
tend have more discreet, unique functions. The practitioner
may also recite some structure in dependent claims to support a
finding of physical apparatus or a finding of application to phys-
ical steps. 50 2
The specification should be drafted so that the means ex-
pressions in the claims correspond to specific hardware circuits
or general purpose computer elements, in addition to the de-
sired software embodiments. At least one, and preferably all, of
these software embodiments should specifically correspond to
the individual hardware elements, because those are the least
likely to cause objection as failing to satisfy the 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 6 requirement of structure. Specific software embod-
iments will also avoid a narrow construction of the claims,
which might otherwise limit the invention to a dedicated hard-
ware apparatus for performing the specified function. Further-
more, the practitioner should include a wide range of exemplary
software embodiments to protect against a narrow range of
equivalents. The practitioner should not assume that the doc-
trine of equivalents 50 3 will extend the claims substantially be-
yond the embodiments in the specification, especially because
claiming software is already stretching the boundaries of the
current law. This guidance, and careful attention to the court's
500. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1541.
501. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). "An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function...." Id. (empha-
sis added).
502. See also Peter J. Ayers, Interpreting In re Alappat With an Eye Towards
Prosecution, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 741,763-65 (1994) (providing appli-
cation drafting guidance to the software patent practitioner).




concerns in Alappat,504 should help the practitioner to draft ap-
plications that meet the current patentability requirements for
software inventions.
IV. Conclusion
Computer software patentability jurisprudence is a rapidly
evolving area of the law. Beginning with Gottschalk v. Ben-
son,50 5 the patentable subject matter issue was phrased in
terms of preventing an inventor from preempting a mathemati-
cal algorithm or a series of abstract ideas-these were excep-
tions to patentable subject matter and they precluded most
software inventions. Providing only narrow, if any, software
protection was advisable at the time because computers and
software were new, and Congress had not yet had an opportu-
nity to address the issues that this new form of intellectual
property presented. In addition, the number of software patent
applications must have been small at the outset. However,
Congress failed to address software patentability even while
software and computers were clearly becoming subjects of a ma-
jor economic industry, and even after prompting by the courts
and commentators. The courts were left to address the issues
on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, the courts had to pro-
ceed cautiously, carving out larger areas of protection and, con-
versely, limiting the exceptions that had previously narrowed
software protection.
Currently, the Federal Circuit is trying to emaciate the
substance of a requirement that had previously been imposed, if
indirectly, by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts.
This "physicality" requirement may serve to deny patentability
where the invention lacks physical structure or when the only
physical substance attributable to an invention resides in a gen-
eral purpose computer. Conversely, the requirement demands
that software inventions possess some physical element-either
physical steps or physical structure-to make the invention
patentable. As case law has shown, this physicality require-
504. See supra parts II.G and III.D.2. See also Ayers, supra note 502, at 763-
65 (demonstrating how patent applications may be specifically tailored to meet the
court's concerns in Alappat).
505. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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ment has acted as a substantial obstacle to software inventors
seeking patent protection.
The Federal Circuit has effectively eroded the physicality
requirement and provided software developers with broader
patent protection by: (a) allowing the patent applicants to cir-
cumvent the physicality requirement with means-plus-function
claims; and (b) minimizing the role of the mathematical al-
gorithm line of cases. The patent practitioner should be aware
that the Federal Circuit is accomplishing this expansion of
software rights by engaging in legal fiction, probably to avoid
reversal and, more importantly, to avoid mistakes with costly
economic repercussions. For now, this legal fiction may be used
to allow inventors to describe software as machine components,
thereby satisfying the patentable subject matter requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The patent practitioner should be prepared
to engage in this legal fiction to secure maximum client intellec-
tual property rights. Ultimately, the physicality requirement
may be so substantially eroded by such legal fiction that the re-
quirement will be discarded altogether. Until then, practition-
ers should treat software claim drafting as a particularly
delicate matter. Finally, the practitioner should caution clients
that the law is not yet settled, and that even the best efforts to
provide software patent protection may be frustrated by
changes in the law.
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